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THE NORMATIVE FOURTH AMENDMENT
Matthew Tokson†
For decades, courts have used a “reasonable expectation of privacy”
standard to determine whether a government action is a Fourth Amendment
search. Scholars have convincingly argued that this test is incoherent, arbitrary,
and incapable of protecting privacy against modern forms of surveillance. Yet
few alternatives have been proposed, and those alternatives pose many of the same
problems as the current standard.
This Article offers a new theoretical approach for determining the scope of
the Fourth Amendment. It develops a normative model of Fourth Amendment
searches, one that explicitly addresses the balance between law enforcement
effectiveness and citizens’ interests inherent in Fourth Amendment law.
Drawing on Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and contextual privacy theory,
it emphasizes surveillance’s concrete impacts, including its deterrence of lawful
activities, interference with relationships and communications, and measurable
psychological harms. The normative model’s pragmatic focus allows it to capture
the fundamental harms and benefits of surveillance while remaining workable for
courts.
The normative approach is consistent with the language, history, and
purposes of the Fourth Amendment, and its values are echoed throughout the
relevant caselaw. It also has important practical advantages over current
doctrine: it is adaptable to technological change, encompasses non-privacy harms
such as coercion and discrimination, reflects Fourth Amendment values more
fully than other approaches, promotes judicial transparency, and is better able to
address large-scale surveillance programs. Further, the normative approach can
help resolve a variety of difficult Fourth Amendment questions involving emails,
Associate Professor, University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law. Thanks
to Shima Baradaran Baughman, Paul Cassell, Dan Epps, Chad Flanders, Aya
Gruber, Eve Hanan, Cathy Hwang, Margot Kaminsky, Orin Kerr, Michael
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Lawrence Solum, James Stern, Lior Strahilevitz, and all workshop participants
at Vanderbilt, Ohio State, Utah, the Ruth Bader Ginsburg Clerks in Academia
Workshop, the Rocky Mountain Junior Scholars Workshop, and the CrimFest
Conference for helpful comments and suggestions. Special thanks to Christian
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internet browsing, smart home technology, financial records, household trash,
and more.
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INTRODUCTION
The concept of a Fourth Amendment “search” is important to both
law enforcement officers and the citizens they may surveil. The
Amendment classically requires officers to obtain a warrant before
engaging in a search, and even the exceptions to this rule typically
demand probable cause. By contrast, when an investigative practice is
not a search, the government can use it to investigate any citizen without
meaningful constitutional regulation.1
Yet the definition of a “search” has changed dramatically over time
and remains contested today. Currently, searches are largely defined by
the Katz test, which looks to whether a person had a “reasonable
expectation of privacy” in the thing searched.2 This expectations-based
test expanded the scope of the Fourth Amendment beyond physical
things and solved the problem of rampant government wiretapping in
the mid-20th century. But it has given rise to a host of new problems and
become one of the most widely disparaged tests in all of American law.3
The test is tautological,4 incoherent,5 ignores important Fourth

For example, the government lawfully gathered millions of citizens’ dialed
phone numbers following Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745–46 (1979), which
held that obtaining such information was not a search.
2 E.g., New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 112 (1986). Investigations involving the
physical touching of property for information-gathering purposes typically
require a warrant under a new and evolving sub-rule. See Florida v. Jardines,
569 U.S. 1, 7–10 (2013); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404–06 (2012).
3 See, e.g., Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58
MINN. L. REV. 349, 384 (1974); Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth
Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468, 1468 (1985); Scott E. Sundby, “Everyman”’s
Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust Between Government and Citizen?, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 1751, 1771 (1994); Morgan Cloud, Rube Goldberg Meets the
Constitution: The Supreme Court, Technology and the Fourth Amendment, 72 MISS.
L.J. 5, 28-29 (2002); Sherry F. Colb, What Is a Search? Two Conceptual Flaws in
Fourth Amendment Doctrine and Some Hints of a Remedy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 119, 121
(2002); Jed Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REV. 101, 103 (2008);
Amitai Etzioni, Eight Nails into Katz’s Coffin, 65 CASE W. L. REV. 413 (2014).
4 William Baude & James Y. Stern, The Positive Law Model of the Fourth
Amendment, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1821, 1824–25 (2016).
5 Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Pragmatism, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1511, 1511
(2010).
1
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Amendment values,6 gives judges free reign to impose their policy
preferences,7 and as a practical matter is notoriously unhelpful.8 It has
failed to protect privacy in many digital forms of information,9 will shrink
the Fourth Amendment’s scope as knowledge of privacy threats
increases,10 and is increasingly useless in the Internet age.11 These
problems stem from a core deficiency: societal expectations are difficult
to assess and offer a shaky foundation for the Fourth Amendment’s
protections. Katz, in short, is poorly suited to regulating government
surveillance in the modern world. The Supreme Court itself has begun
to recognize the deficiencies of the current regime, holding in Carpenter v.
United States that the Fourth Amendment protects against cell phone
location tracking despite the fact that cell phone location data is not
“private” and is exposed to third-party companies.12 As the Court starts
to move beyond the strictures of the Katz test, the time is right to rethink
how the Fourth Amendment applies to modern surveillance practices.
But while critiques of the Katz test are legion, concrete alternatives
are rare. There is a growing recognition that the question of the Fourth
Amendment’s scope is inescapably normative—that it requires courts to
make a value judgment about when the Fourth Amendment should
protect citizens’ privacy, rather than simply determining whether citizens
generally expect privacy.13 A number of scholars have accordingly
William Stuntz, Privacy’s Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93 MICH. L.
REV. 1016, 1021 (1995).
7 Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring).
8 Carter, 525 U.S. at 97 (Scalia, J., concurring); see Solove, supra note 5, at 1522–
24.
9 E.g., Etzioni, supra note 3, at 421–22; Colb, supra note 3, at 132–39.
10 Matthew Tokson, Knowledge and Fourth Amendment Privacy, 111 NW. U. L.
REV. 139, 187 (2016).
11 Paul Ohm, The Fourth Amendment in a World Without Privacy, 81 MISS. L. J.
1309, 1325–26 (2012).
12 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018).
13 Note that the terms “citizens” or “people” used below encompass resident
aliens, although the Supreme Court has not directly ruled that the Fourth
Amendment applies to such persons. Cf. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,
494 US 259, 271 (1990) (holding that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to
nonresident aliens but noting that similar protections apply to residents); INS v.
Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1984) (assuming without deciding that
the Fourth Amendment applied to an undocumented immigrant present in the
United States).
6
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argued that courts should take a more normative approach to the Fourth
Amendment.14 But little progress has been made towards developing an
actual normative test, beyond simply calling for courts to create one.15
This Article takes a different approach. It develops a specific,
detailed normative model for determining the scope of the Fourth
Amendment. The model is grounded in contextual theories of
surveillance, which focus on the specific activities and communications
that surveillance disrupts. It draws on Fourth Amendment precedents
that reflect many of the same concerns, which are sometimes lost in the
futile search for societal expectations. And it addresses a literature that
has received relatively little attention in Fourth Amendment scholarship,
encompassing numerous studies of the measurable harms of surveillance
to its targets.16
Drawing on these sources, the normative model breaks out
surveillance harms into three categories: avoidance of activities because
of fear of surveillance; harm to relationships and communications; and
direct psychological or physical harm. These harms are measurable and
often well-documented.17 Yet they are also easier for judges to intuit in
difficult cases than concepts like societal knowledge or expectations.18
On the other side of the balance are the benefits of crime detection
and prevention. This inquiry would consider, for instance, whether a
surveillance technique would primarily be used in the early stages of an
investigation in order to build probable cause, and whether it would be
likely to reveal criminal activity that would otherwise be impossible to
detect.19 A normative test would also examine whether the same
information might be obtained through less invasive means.20
Considering these factors, if a surveillance practice causes harms to
individuals that outweigh the benefits from enhanced law enforcement,
courts should hold that the Fourth Amendment requires the police to
obtain a warrant (or satisfy an exception to the warrant requirement)
before conducting the surveillance.
See infra Part I.A.
See id.
16 See infra Part I.C.2.c.
17 See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 113–118.
18 See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 82.
19 See infra Part I.C.1.
20 See infra Part I.C.3.
14
15
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The goal of the proposal is to move past mere critique of the Katz test
and towards formulating a workable replacement, one that is better able
to address the ever-changing landscape of modern surveillance. Like any
legal regime, the normative model is hardly perfect, and potential
objections to it are addressed in detail below.21 But there are numerous
theoretical and practical reasons to favor a normative approach. A
normative balancing test reflects the values at the heart of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence more fully and effectively than other
approaches. It is likewise consistent with the text and history of the
Fourth Amendment.22 Indeed, both the leading originalist interpretation
of the Amendment and less formalist theories of construction support a
balancing approach to the crucial question of when the government can
engage in suspicionless surveillance.23
The functional advantages of the normative test are substantial, and
arguably essential for addressing modern surveillance practices. The test
is, for example, adaptable to new surveillance technologies and new
social contexts. It takes into account harms that other approaches ignore,
including coercion and discrimination. It is far better suited to
addressing programmatic surveillance and data analysis. And it directly
considers the normative values at stake in Fourth Amendment cases,
avoiding the false targets and arbitrariness of alternative tests.24
Moreover, the test can be usefully applied to a variety of Fourth
Amendment questions that courts and scholars struggle with under
current law. It can offer clear answers in frontier cases such as those
involving internet browsing data, smart home technology, or email
content. The normative approach can also help rehabilitate some widely
criticized cases that have plausible outcomes but dubious reasoning.
Finally, the test can help identify flawed cases that are ripe for reversal,
where the normative balance tilts sharply in favor of privacy or
surveillance but current law leads courts to the opposite outcome.
The Article proceeds in five Parts. Part I describes the normative
model in detail and traces its lineage in Fourth Amendment precedent
and surveillance theory. Part II discusses the textual, historical, and
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part II.
23 See infra Part II.B.
24 Additional advantages are discussed infra at Part III.
21
22
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theoretical foundations of a balancing approach to the Fourth
Amendment’s scope. Part III examines the many practical advantages of
the normative approach. Part IV addresses potential objections to the
normative test and to balancing tests in general. It also examines an
alternative approach that looks to positive law as the basis for the Fourth
Amendment’s protections. Part V applies the normative model to resolve
frontier cases, provide firmer support for poorly reasoned cases, and
identify deeply flawed cases suitable for reversal.

I. TOWARDS A NEW MODEL OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
A. The Katz Test and the Need for Normativity
The Supreme Court has established that a Fourth Amendment search
occurs when a government act violates an individual’s “reasonable
expectation of privacy.”25 This standard derives from Justice Harlan’s
solo concurrence in the 1967 case Katz v. United States.26
E.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984). The Supreme Court has
recently adopted a sub-test that finds a Fourth Amendment search when a
government official physically intrudes on property for the purposes of
gathering information. See Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 7–10 (2013); United
States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404–06 (2012). This has, thus far, added little to the
Katz test, and the Supreme Court cases where it has been employed would
likely have reached the same outcome under Katz. Jardines, 569 U.S. at 12–16
(Kagan, J., concurring); Jones, 565 U.S. at 418–31 (Alito, J., concurring in the
judgment). It has also rapidly become confusing and difficult to apply, as the
Court has had to determine the extent of an implied social license to enter the
curtilage of a home—a question bound up in a social norms inquiry even more
amorphous and confusing than the Katz test. Jardines, 569 U.S. at 10; George M.
Dery III, Failing to Keep “Easy Cases Easy”: Florida v. Jardines Refuses to Reconcile
Inconsistencies in Fourth Amendment Privacy Law by Instead Focusing on Physical
Trespass, 47 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 451, 471–79 (2014).
26 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). This approach was quickly
adopted by lower courts and the Supreme Court as the definitive test. E.g.,
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (“We have recently held that . . . wherever an
individual may harbor a reasonable ‘expectation of privacy,’ he is entitled to be
free from unreasonable government intrusion.”) (quoting Katz 389 U.S. at 361
(Harlan, J., concurring)); United States v. Guadalupe-Garza, 421 F.2d 876, 878
(9th Cir. 1970) (considering whether defendant had a “reasonable expectation
of privacy” when crossing the border from Mexico to California).
25
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Criticism of the test began not long after its adoption and has only
grown in volume and intensity over the years.27 Critics argue that a test
based on expectations is unworkable and tautological.28 They note the
potential for circularity, as societal expectations about privacy may be
shaped by government practices and judicial decisions.29 They point out
that courts are poorly situated to assess societal views about privacy.30
Moreover, an expectations-based Fourth Amendment will shrink over
time as knowledge of privacy threats increases.31
For decades, and increasingly often in recent years, scholars have
called upon courts to take a more normative approach.32 Such an
approach would focus on the level of privacy that citizens should have
rather than how much privacy they expect.33
Calls for a normative approach to the Fourth Amendment sometimes
follow broad critiques of the Katz test,34 but they also arise in narrower
works examining new surveillance technologies.35 These analyses are
See, e.g., Joseph D. Grano, Perplexing Questions about Three Basic Fourth
Amendment Issues: Fourth Amendment Activity, Probable Cause, and the Warrant
Requirement, 69 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 425, 429 (1969); sources cited supra
note 4.
28 Baude & Stern, supra note 4, at 1824–25.
29 E.g., Rubenfeld, supra note 3, at 132−33
30 Daniel J. Solove, supra note 5, at 1521−22.
31 E.g., Tokson, supra note 10, at 187.
32 See, e.g., Neil Richards, The Third-Party Doctrine and the Future of the Cloud, 94
WASH. U. L. REV. 1441, 1487−88 (2018); Olivier Sylvain, Failing Expectations:
Fourth Amendment Doctrine in the Era of Total Surveillance, 49 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 485, 522 (2014); Justin Holbrook, Communications Privacy in the Military, 25
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 831, 903 (2010); Catherine Hancock, Warrants for Wearing A
Wire: Fourth Amendment Privacy and Justice Harlan's Dissent in United States v.
White, 79 MISS. L.J. 35, 36−38 (2009); Gavin Skok, Establishing A Legitimate
Expectation of Privacy in Clickstream Data, 6 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 61,
82–83 (2000); James J. Tomkovicz, Beyond Secrecy for Secrecy's Sake: Toward an
Expanded Vision of the Fourth Amendment Privacy Province, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 645,
698 (1985).
33 E.g., Aya Gruber, Garbage Pails and Puppy Dog Tails: Is That What Katz Is Made
of?, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 781, 795 (2008) (“At some level the constitutional
inquiry must concern not just what society actually believes is private, but what
we ought to be able to regard as private.”).
34 See, e.g., Tomkovicz, supra note 32, at 698.
35 See, e.g., Skok, supra note 32, at 82−83. Justice Harlan himself called for a
more normative approach, repudiating in part the Katz test that he had created,
in a case involving an undercover government agent’s recording of a
27
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generally insightful. Yet these divergent writings share a profound
humility regarding the content of a normative test. They sometimes note
“[t]he difficulty [in] determining the right normative formula,”36 or
clarify that the general normative approach they favor is “fact-driven”
and imprecise,37 or explain that “[in] this initial effort it would be futile to
attempt to provide closure on the subject of possible grounds” for a
normative test.38 More commonly, they simply urge courts to take a
normative approach and reach the correct results in various cases,
without explaining what such an approach would entail.39 A few
scholars have taken a descriptive approach, examining federal and state
post-Katz cases and identifying things that seem to correlate with Fourth
Amendment violations (such as intrusiveness) or that are generally
relevant to privacy (such as the nature of the information sought).40 But
these correlates have not yielded a test, except perhaps a “totality of the
circumstances” test that directs courts to weigh any relevant normative
considerations and reach the best outcome.41
conversation. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 768 (1971) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
36 Gruber, supra note 33, at 838.
37 Mary Graw Leary, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy for Youth in A Digital Age,
80 MISS. L.J. 1035, 1091 (2011).
38 Tomkovicz, supra note 32, at 703.
39 See, e.g., Sylvain, supra note 32, at 522; Skok, supra note 32, at 82−83.
40 Susan Freiwald, First Principles of Communications Privacy, 2007 STAN. TECH. L.
REV. 3, ¶¶ 64–66 (discussing intrusive searches); Stephen E. Henderson, Beyond
the (Current) Fourth Amendment: Protecting Third-Party Information, Third Parties,
and the Rest of Us Too, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 975, 985–1014 (2007) (listing
considerations relevant to privacy); Melvin Gutterman, A Formulation of the
Value and Means Models of the Fourth Amendment in the Age of Technologically
Enhanced Surveillance, 39 SYRACUSE L. REV. 647, 722–23 (1988) (discussing
generalities relevant to privacy).
41 Henderson, supra note 15, at 985–1014, 1026 (noting several nondispositive
considerations relevant to privacy and affirming the importance of a “totality of
the circumstances” approach to the Fourth Amendment). Paul Ohm has
described Carpenter v. United States as radically changing the Katz test itself and
virtually replacing it with the standard for cell phone data set out in Carpenter,
which looks to the “the deeply revealing nature of [cell phone data], its depth,
breadth, and comprehensive reach, and the inescapable and automatic nature
of its collection,” as well as the increased efficiency of collecting cell phone
location information. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 2206, 2223, 2218;
Paul Ohm, The Many Revolutions of Carpenter, HARV. J. L. & TECH. __ (2019),
manuscript at 7−8. Even assuming that this standard is now controlling in the

7
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What explains the reluctance to specify how courts should
normatively determine the scope of the Fourth Amendment? One of the
earliest and most illuminating calls for a normative approach, from James
Tomkovicz’s 1985 Article, suggests that the difficulty of formulating a
normative test stems in part from the difficulty of conceptualizing the
harms that government surveillance can cause.42 Tomkovicz offers no
test and notes that there are “no ready guides” for value judgments
regarding citizens’ privacy, but posits that as theories of privacy and
related constitutional values develop, courts could incorporate their
conclusions into a normative approach.43
Several decades later, the time has come to incorporate the insights
of privacy and surveillance theory into a concrete Fourth Amendment
test. Such theory has made enormous progress over the past thirty years
and in a variety of fields, including law, sociology, philosophy, and
information science. Among other developments, privacy theory has
largely shifted from identifying abstract principles of privacy towards
focusing on the specific practices, communications, and freedoms that
privacy enables.
Scholars have offered various general theories of privacy, including
privacy as control over information,44 limited exposure to others,45

third party doctrine context, it is unlikely that the Court intended it to modify
Katz. Indeed, the Court took pains to avoid providing any guidance on future
Fourth Amendment issues, emphasizing that “[o]ur opinion today is a narrow
one” and listing several Fourth Amendment issues (including those closely
related to historical cell phone data) on which the Court expressed no opinion.
See Carpenter, 138 S.Ct. 2220. Still, Ohm’s point is well taken that Carpenter
might serve as a basis for a rethinking of the Katz test. See Ohm, manuscript at
7−8. I have elsewhere argued that the Carpenter and United States v. Jones
opinions reflect the Court’s recognition of factors that have long dictated its
application of Katz. Tokson, manuscript at 2.
42 Tomkovicz, supra note 32, at 701−02.
43 Id. at 702−03.
44 E.g., ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967); Charles Fried, Privacy, 77
YALE L.J. 475 (1968).
45 E.g., SISSELA BOK, SECRETS: ON THE ETHICS OF CONCEALMENT AND REVELATION
(1983); Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 423 (1980).

8
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intimacy,46 bodily integrity,47 and as a precondition to self-development.48
Yet theorists have increasingly recognized that the meaning of privacy is
rarely fixed or universal, and that its value often depends on the social
contexts in which it can protect individuals from coercion, condemnation,
and other harms.49 As social practices and norms change, different
aspects of privacy can become more or less important. For instance,
control over data may be increasingly important in the Internet era, while
limiting exposure to others may be less of a concern in an age of larger
houses and increasing social isolation. Moreover, some aspects of
privacy may be crucial in some contexts and irrelevant in others.
In order to develop a more complete account of privacy harm,
theories of contextual privacy have looked to the norms that govern
information exchange in a wide variety of social contexts and
relationships.50 When people offer their information in a certain context,
the exchange of information is generally governed by implicit agreements
regarding its use.51 These agreements and norms might dictate, for
instance, that the parties restrict further information flow or maintain
anonymity by declining to link the data with personally identifiable
information.52 Violations of these context-dependent norms lead to
identifiable harms, as parties’ preferences are ignored and their interests
adversely affected.53 Thus a clinical worker who disclosed a patient’s
treatment for addiction would violate norms of behavior specific to the
treatment context, causing harms to the patient’s reputation,
psychological well-being, employment prospects, etc.
E.g., JULIE C. INNESS, PRIVACY, INTIMACY, AND ISOLATION (1992); Tom Gerety,
Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 233, 268 (1977).
47 E.g., Richard B. Parker, A Definition of Privacy, 27 RUTGERS L. REV. 275, 283–84
(1974).
48 E.g., Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as
Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373 (2000); Anita L. Allen, Coercing Privacy, 40 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 723 (1999); Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace,
52 Vand. L. Rev. 1609 (1999).
49 See, e.g., HELEN FAY NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY,
AND THE INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE 80−89 (2010); Adam D. Barth, et al., Privacy
and Contextual Integrity: Framework and Applications, 2006 PROCEEDINGS OF THE
IEEE SYMPOSIUM ON SECURITY AND PRIVACY 184 (May 2006).
50 Id.
51 Id. at 125.
52 See id. at 186–87.
53 See id. at 212.
46
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Relatedly, pragmatic privacy theories focus on how the lack of
privacy deters and interrupts specific social and personal practices.54
They posit that the value of privacy depends on the practices that it
protects, which include activities as varied as political activism,
shopping, communication, research, nudity, and intimacy.55 Likewise,
the concept of intellectual privacy has called attention to the importance
of privacy to expressive activities, personal communications, and
freedom of thought itself.56 It reveals a particularly important set of
practices and cognition that surveillance has the potential to disrupt.
These and other recent theoretical movements offer a deeper, more
specific, and more practical understanding of the harms of surveillance.
Their insights can help provide a foundation for a workable normative
approach to the Fourth Amendment.
This Article’s analysis of the harms of government surveillance can,
in turn, help to further develop and refine contextual and pragmatic
privacy theories. The Article examines in detail a particularly important
privacy context: surveillance by police or other government officials of
private citizens. It identifies the most fundamental disruptions and
harms caused by such surveillance. More broadly, the Article develops
an analytical approach that can be used to evaluate private intrusions and
government surveillance alike.
The following sections propose a concrete, normative test for the
Fourth Amendment’s scope and trace the lineage of each factor of the test
in surveillance theory, constitutional practice, or both. Part II then
discusses the test’s doctrinal, historical, and theoretical foundations.

B. A Normative Test
An effective normative test for the Fourth Amendment’s scope
would balance the benefits of warrantless government surveillance
against its costs. However, a test that merely directs courts to weigh all
benefits to law enforcement against all harms to citizens is not sufficiently
detailed or rigorous. Such a standard would require each individual
See Daniel Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087, 1126−32
(2002).
55 Id. at 1143, 1146−54.
56 See Neil Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387, 412−26 (2008).
54
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court to determine how best to theorize and assess the various harms of
surveillance, likely resulting in extreme inconsistency and prohibitively
high decision costs.
Courts require a more concrete, workable test. But, if it is to reflect
the normative balance inherent in the Fourth Amendment, such a test
must also incorporate essential categories of law enforcement benefit and
social harm. The following proposal attempts to fulfill these goals and
strike a middle ground between including important categories of
surveillance harm and remaining concise. Its aim is not only to offer a
workable test, but to shift the focus of Fourth Amendment debate from
the general need for a normative approach to what such an approach
should look like.
The normative test asks whether a surveillance practice’s value to
law enforcement in terms of crime detection and prevention outweighs
three fundamental harms: the avoidance of lawful activity because of fear
of surveillance; the harm to relationships and communications caused by
observation; and the concrete psychological or physical harm suffered
due to surveillance. The test then asks whether the same law enforcement
goals could be achieved via a less invasive practice. If, considering these
factors, the total harm to citizens from a type of surveillance outweighs
the total benefit from enhanced law enforcement, courts should hold that
the Fourth Amendment requires police to obtain a warrant (or to satisfy
an exception to the warrant requirement) before conducting the
surveillance. If the benefit to law enforcement outweighs the harm, then
the police should be able to conduct the surveillance without Fourth
Amendment regulation.
These three categories of harm are derived not only from basic
Fourth Amendment ideals like privacy, liberty, and security, but also a
consideration of the functional and practical values these ideals protect.57
For a discussion of historical Fourth Amendment ideals, see, e.g., Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) (“It is not the breaking of [a man’s]
doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the
offense; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security,
personal liberty, and private property.”); Morgan Cloud, Searching through
History; Searching for History, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1707, 1726 (1996) (“[T]he
historical record suggests that objections to general warrants and general
searches alike rested upon broad concerns about protecting privacy, property,
and liberty from unwarranted and unlimited intrusions.”).
57
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The Fourth Amendment is designed to prevent arbitrary government
surveillance,58 a valuable goal not only in itself but also because such
surveillance prevents us from acting freely, stifles our relationships and
free association, and does harm to us both as individuals and as citizens
of a democracy. These practical values are embodied in the proposed
test. Each of the factors has a basis in existing Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, well-developed theories of privacy and police coercion, or
both. The following sections discuss the factors in more detail and
discuss their doctrinal and theoretical foundations.

C. The Factors in Depth
1.

Crime Detection and Prevention

The first factor of the test examines a warrantless surveillance
practice’s benefits to law enforcement, which can primarily be expressed
in terms of enhanced crime detection and enhanced deterrence.59 Because
detection and prevention are generally linked, the test combines them in
a single inquiry.60
This factor essentially asks, how valuable to law enforcement would
it be to be able to engage in a certain type of warrantless surveillance? A
court might consider whether a surveillance technique would primarily
be used in the early stages of investigations, before probable cause has
been developed, and whether the warrantless use of the technique would
be likely to reveal criminal activity that would otherwise go undetected.61
E.g., Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L.
REV. 547, 744−45. (1999).
59 It would also encompass evidence collection for the purposes of conviction,
which would have benefits related to detection, deterrence, incapacitation, and
retribution.
60 See, e.g., Daniel S. Nagin & Greg Pogarsky, Integrating Celerity, Impulsivity, and
Extralegal Sanction Threats into a Model of General Deterrence: Theory and Evidence,
39 CRIMINOLOGY 865, 883–84 (2001) (Studying drinking and driving trends
among college students and finding that the certainty of punishment was a
stronger deterrent than the severity of punishment). Courts might optionally
prefer to analyze these facts of law enforcement separately, breaking this factor
out into two separate factors on the law enforcement side of the balance.
61 Courts could also consider relevant studies examining the effects of limiting
58
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For example, if obtaining certain financial records without a warrant
would allow police to identify white collar crimes that would otherwise
be difficult to detect, that would weigh in favor of excluding such records
from Fourth Amendment regulation.62 Relatedly, courts could consider
studies examining the effects of limiting a particular surveillance
technique. Research indicating that limits on certain kinds of surveillance
would reduce police ability to build probable cause63 or to deter certain
crimes64 may help to quantify the value of the surveillance to law
enforcement goals. Reports issued by agencies tasked with independent
evaluation, such as the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, may
also be helpful in assessing law enforcement efficacy.65
The consideration of law enforcement effectiveness is grounded in
Fourth Amendment caselaw, although courts’ treatment of it has been
haphazard and unstructured. The Supreme Court has explicitly
various surveillance techniques. One recent study, for instance, found that
subjecting telephone call logs to a warrant requirement resulted in fewer
applications for wiretaps and a decrease in the duration of permitted wiretaps.
Anne E. Boustead, POLICE, PROCESS, AND PRIVACY: THREE ESSAYS ON THE THIRD
PARTY DOCTRINE, 18–20 (2016),
https://www.rand.org/pubs/rgs_dissertations/RGSD384.html. Its findings
suggest that regulating the acquisition of call log data reduces police officers’
ability to obtain sufficient probable cause for Wiretap Act applications. Id.
62 See Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment,
125 HARV. L. REV. 476, 509 (2011) (explaining that the Supreme Court
eliminated the warrant requirement for financial records following the rise of
difficult-to-detect white-collar crimes); see also David Gray, Danielle Keats
Citron & Liz Clark Rinehart, Fighting Cybercrime After United States v. Jones,
103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 745, 777–78, 798 (2013) (discussing types of
digital evidence that are especially helpful in detecting healthcare fraud and
cyberharassment).
63 Boustead, supra note 61, at 18−20.
64 See Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, What Caused the 2016 Chicago Homicide
Spike? An Empirical Examination of the ‘ACLU Effect’ and the Role of Stop and Frisks
in Preventing Gun Violence, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2018)
(manuscript at 63) (noting an increase in gun violence in the year following the
cessation of programmatic stop-and-frisk searches in Chicago); Gary T. Marx,
Seeing Hazily (But Not Darkly) Through the Lens: Some Recent Empirical Studies of
Surveillance Technologies, 30 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 339, 349 (2005) (discussing the
deterrent effects of video monitoring in interrogation rooms on violence by
both detainees and the police).
65 See Daphna Renan, The Fourth Amendment as Administrative Governance, 68
STAN. L. REV. 1039, 1119−21 (2016).
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considered benefits to law enforcement in cases concerning the Fourth
Amendment’s scope,66 and such benefits implicitly justify the results in
countless other scope cases.67 This consideration also helps determine the
effective scope of the Amendment by shaping and limiting its remedies.68
At the level of theory, some concern for effective law enforcement is
inherent in the existence of criminal laws. The theoretical justifications
for criminal law enforcement are largely identical to those that justify
criminal laws and punishments—the utilitarian benefits of deterrence,
public safety, and rehabilitation;69 the deontological values of justice and
retribution;70 or a pragmatic mixture of both.71 Any normative balancing
See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526–27 (1984) (discussing the importance
of detecting inmate crimes in a prison setting); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S.
435, 442–43(1976) (noting the “high degree of usefulness in criminal tax, and
regulatory investigations and proceedings” of bank records); Arizona v. Gant,
556 U.S. 332, 344, 347 (2009) (mentioning the evidentiary interests of the police
as a justification for broadening the scope of the vehicular search incident to
arrest doctrine).
67 See, e.g., Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 90−91 (1998) (holding that the
Fourth Amendment does not apply to temporary house guests who are not
personal friends of the homeowner, in a case involving a drug sale); California
v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213–14 (1986) (concluding that police officers are
entitled to view a house’s curtilage from any place where citizens can lawfully
go, including airspace); see also United States v. Mohamud, 843 F.3d 420, 439−41
(9th Cir. 2016) (holding that no warrant is required to collect a U.S. citizen’s
emails to a foreign national, in a case involving allegations of terrorism).
68 For example, the “good-faith exception” cases limit the application of the
exclusionary rule in large part because of the rule’s detrimental effects on law
enforcement and criminal deterrence. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Bd. of Prob. &
Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 364−65 (1998) (“[T]he exclusionary rule … allows
many who would otherwise be incarcerated to escape the consequences of their
actions … the rule’s costly toll upon truth-seeking and law enforcement
objectives presents a high obstacle for those urging application of the rule.”)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Courts grant qualified immunity to law
enforcement officers for violations of the Fourth Amendment for similar
reasons. See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982) (justifying
qualified immunity in part on concerns that a lack of immunity would deter
law enforcement officers from performing their duties to the full extent).
69 E.g., Joel Feinberg, The Classic Debate, in PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 727, 729 (Joel
Feinberg & Jules Coleman eds., 6th ed. 2000).
70 E.g., Michael T. Cahill, Retributive Justice in the Real World, 85 WASH. U. L. REV.
815, 826–28 (2007).
71 E.g., Stephen P. Garvey, Lifting the Veil on Punishment, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV.
443, 449–50 (2004).
66
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approach to regulating law enforcement must take law enforcement
effectiveness into account.

2.

Harms to Individuals

As discussed above, a workable normative test must capture the
most substantial harms caused by government surveillance and be
sufficiently administrable that judges can effectively apply the test.72
Contextual and pragmatic theories of surveillance point the way towards
a test that can meet both needs. They focus on the particular practices
and relationships disrupted by surveillance. This practical emphasis has
several benefits. First, it can unify various theories of privacy and other
Fourth Amendment values like liberty and trust by emphasizing their
shared practical concerns rather than their abstract theoretical
differences.73 Second, the practical harms of surveillance are easier for
judges to address than are esoteric theories of privacy or trust.
The normative test proposed here combines a focus on disrupted
practices and relationships with another category of fundamental harms:
measurable psychological or physical harms suffered by the subjects of
government investigations. By incorporating these factors, the test can
capture the primary harms to individuals from government surveillance
without requiring judges to grapple with abstract theories or societal
expectations.
Although the test focuses on the pragmatic harms of surveillance, its
focus is necessarily broad, addressing the surveillance technique used in
the relevant case as a whole rather than in isolation. It does so by
hypothesizing that the surveillance technique has become widespread
and well-known, and asking how people’s behavior would change as a
result or how they would be directly harmed. This comprehensive
approach is necessary for several reasons. First, a broad approach to the
harms of surveillance is necessary to match the broad consideration of
law enforcement benefits. The Supreme Court frequently considers the
general benefits of surveillance to law enforcement, benefits that go

See supra Part I.B.
See generally Solove, supra note 54 (discussing the theoretical differences
between the leading privacy theories).
72
73
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beyond those realized in the instant case.74 Courts should likewise
consider the widespread harms of surveillance when evaluating potential
Fourth Amendment searches. Second, predicting the exact future
prevalence of a surveillance technique or determining the likely extent of
societal knowledge would be very difficult, especially for courts
addressing novel surveillance technologies.75 Finally, a broad assessment
better aligns courts’ analyses with the potential consequences of their
decisions.
Fourth Amendment cases nearly always have broad
implications. When a court rules that the police may dig through one
defendant’s trash bags without a warrant, the police can thereafter dig
through the trash bags of any person in the court’s jurisdiction.76 By
assessing surveillance techniques as a whole, the normative test
appropriately focuses courts’ attention on the actual impacts of their
decisions.
a)

Deterring Lawful Activities

The first harm factor asks whether a given type of surveillance would

See supra notes 66, 68.
Tokson, supra note 10, at 164−79 (discussing the difficulties of measuring
societal knowledge in even the most favorable circumstances).
76 See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988). Resource constraints may
prevent police departments from engaging in costly surveillance on a grand
scale. For lower-cost types of surveillance or for national security matters,
however, the government might actually surveil most or all citizens. Thus
courts might safely assume that the use of a costly surveillance technique
would be less widespread than that of a cheap technique, potentially affecting
the extent of the harm caused. For a detailed argument regarding surveillance
costs and the importance of assessing surveillance technologies as a whole, see
David Gray & Danielle Citron, The Right to Quantitative Privacy, 98 MINN. L.
REV. 62, 101−03 (2013).
Further, courts applying a normative test would primarily focus on the
domestic law enforcement context but could also consider the domestic antiterrorism context if doing so is helpful. By contrast, foreign intelligence
surveillance may be exempt from the warrant requirement in any event,
potentially making the question whether such surveillance is a “search”
irrelevant. See generally United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 913–
15 (4th Cir. 1980) (concluding that “the courts should not require the executive
to secure a warrant each time it conducts foreign intelligence surveillance,” but
noting that those reasons do not justify warrantless domestic surveillance).
74
75

16

DRAFT - Forthcoming, 104 Minnesota L. Rev. (2019)

cause people to avoid lawful activities. People engage in all manner of
potentially sensitive, embarrassing, or controversial activities, like
visiting a psychiatrist, researching sensitive subjects online, purchasing
certain drugs or medical equipment, joining a substance-abuse support
group, or criticizing government or social elites. These lawful activities
can be deterred by the threat of surveillance. For example, Google
searches for terms deemed by user surveys as especially controversial or
embarrassing decreased significantly following Edward Snowden’s
disclosure of an NSA program capable of capturing internet
information.77 Likewise, researchers documented a reduction in a wide
variety of religious and social activities at New York mosques due to
increased police surveillance after the September 11 attacks.78
Courts may assess deterrence of lawful activities by using studies
that show reduced activity following increased awareness of
surveillance.79 Empirical studies on chilling effects have become
increasingly common in recent years.80 Courts may also rely on expert
Alex Marthews & Catherine Tucker, Government Surveillance and Internet
Search Behavior (Feb. 17, 2017),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2412564. Search terms
studied included “abortion,” “gender reassignment,” “police brutality,” and
“tax avoidance.” Id. at 49–50.
78 Diala Shamas & Nermeen Arastu, Mapping Muslims: NYPD Spying and its
Impact on American Muslims, Mar. 2013, at 12−15, available at
http://www.law.cuny.edu/academics/clinics/immigration/clear/MappingMuslims.pdf.
79 See, e.g., Jonathan W. Penney, Chilling Effects: Online Surveillance and Wikipedia
Use, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 117, 146−57 (2016) (finding that views of Wikipedia
articles on sensitive topics decreased significantly following the Snowden
revelations); Marthews & Tucker, supra note 77. See also Darhl M. Pedersen,
Psychological Functions of Privacy, 17 J. ENV. PSYCH. 147. 150−52 (1997)
(presenting survey results evaluating everyday activities that depend upon
privacy); MIKE MCCAHILL, THE SURVEILLANCE WEB 145 (2002) (discussing the
effects of video monitoring on the social behavior of mall security guards).
80 See, e.g., Jonathon Penney, Internet Surveillance, Regulation, and Chilling
Effects Online: A Comparative Case Study, 6 INTERNET POL’Y REV., May 26,
2017, at 1, 3 (reporting survey evidence that government surveillance of the
internet would reduce online speech, make speakers more guarded in terms of
the content of their online speech, and chill online searching.); PEN America,
Chilling Effects: NSA Surveillance Drives US Writers to Self-Censor, at 3 (Nov.
12, 2013) (reporting that 28% of surveyed writers had curtailed social media
activities out of concerns about surveillance, while 16% had avoided writing or
speaking about certain subjects). See generally JONATHON W. PENNEY,
77
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witnesses or amicus briefs from professional associations noting the
activities that a type of surveillance may discourage, as the Supreme
Court did in Ferguson v. City of Charleston.81
Moreover, judges are likely to be able to assess deterrence of lawful
activities even in situations where there are no directly relevant studies.
Whether surveillance would deter a person from engaging in lawful
activities is a question that judges can fruitfully address through
reasoning and intuition—if I were being surveilled by government agents
using the technique at issue in this case, would I be likely to forego certain
activities? For example, a judge assessing long-term video monitoring by
drones might recognize that she would likely curtail her activities in
public and in the back yard of her home because of the monitoring, and
this likely reduction in lawful activity would weigh in favor of requiring
a warrant for long-term drone surveillance. Judges are likely to be more
successful in forming intuitions about how their own activities would be
impacted by surveillance than grappling with abstract theories of privacy
or attempting to calculate societal expectations.82
Judicial intuitions are, of course, not infallible and are subject to

CHILLING EFFECTS: UNDERSTANDING THE IMPACT OF
SURVEILLANCE AND OTHER DIGITAL THREATS (forthcoming 2020).
81 532 U.S. 67, 84 n.23 (2001) (noting that the American Medical Association and
other groups filing amicus briefs agreed that drug testing of pregnant patients’
urine would deter women who use drugs from seeking prenatal care.)
82 One might object that judges applying the Katz test can already use personal
intuitions about whether they would expect privacy. Aside from the myriad
problems with using anyone’s expectations as a barometer for Fourth
Amendment protection, see supra note 3, judicial intuition regarding privacy
expectations is likely to be systematically biased against privacy interests.
Expectations of privacy are inextricably linked to knowledge regarding
surveillance and privacy threats. See Tokson, supra note 10, at 149–50. Judges
will generally have unusually high levels of knowledge regarding the
surveillance technique at issue—the parties will have informed them at length
about the technology in their pleadings and briefs. Thus they may expect less
privacy in a given context than the vast majority of people. Further, judges’
acquired knowledge is likely to bias their intuitive judgments about societal
knowledge in general. Individuals tend to automatically and irrationally
impute their own knowledge to other people, even when those people are
extremely unlikely to know it. See Boaz Keysar et al., States of Affairs and States
of Mind: The Effect of Knowledge of Beliefs, 64 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM.
DECISION PROCESSES 283, 284 (1995).
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inaccuracy and bias.83 Social science studies provide more objective
evidence but are likewise imperfect and prone to misinterpretation.84
This Article does not argue that judges will employ either source of
information perfectly. It does contend that judicial intuition is better
suited for assessing surveillance’s dampening effects on activities and
relationships than for intuiting the state of societal expectations of
privacy.85 Moreover, there is an extensive social science literature on
surveillance harms that can aid judges in their assessments.86
Courts are likely to be able to evaluate surveillance’s potential impact
on lawful activities—indeed, they have already done so in several cases.
In Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, the Court examined whether police searches
of newspaper offices would interfere with the newspaper’s operations,
dissuade confidential sources from coming forward, motivate editors to
suppress controversial news stories, or “intrude into or to deter normal
editorial and publication decisions.”87 Likewise, in cases involving
searches and seizures of expressive materials, the Court has emphasized
the need for the rigorous application of Fourth Amendment protections
to prevent the stifling of legitimate book distribution or movie displays.88
Tokson, supra note 10, at 172−73.
J. Alexander Tanford, The Limits of A Scientific Jurisprudence: The Supreme
Court and Psychology, 66 IND. L.J. 137, 145 (1990).
85 See supra note 82.
86 There is a smaller but growing collection of surveys about surveillance and
privacy expectations that can assist judges in assessing such expectations under
Katz. See Brief of Amici Curiae Empirical Fourth Amendment Scholars in
Support of Petitioner at 4–10, Carpenter v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 2206 (2018)
(No. 16-402), 2018 WL 3073916 (discussing studies that ask respondents about
their expectations of privacy). Courts have thus far been reluctant to employ
such data, and people’s reported expectations may not match their behavior or
may be more aspirational than actual. See Tokson, supra note 10, at 180.
Nonetheless, the use of empirical studies of societal expectations and
knowledge would likely improve the accuracy of courts’ decisions under the
Katz test. Id. However, the many conceptual flaws of the Katz test itself
recommend abandoning the test even if courts were able to adjudicate it
perfectly. See, e.g., id. at 181−87.
87 Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 566 (1978).
88 See, e.g., Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 504−05 (1973) (expressing
concerns about police searches and seizures suppressing legitimate displays of
movies); Quantity of Copies of Books v. State of Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 211 (1964)
(holding that an overbroad warrant was unconstitutional in part because of its
potential for deterring the publication of legitimate books). Justice Sotomayor
83
84
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Nor has this principle been limited to cases involving expressive
activities. In Ferguson v. City of Charleston, the Supreme Court held that a
public hospital’s program of drug testing pregnant women’s urine
violated the Fourth Amendment, noting that medical professionals
apparently agreed that such programs “discourag[ed] women who use
drugs from seeking prenatal care.”89
A concern with the deterrence of legitimate activities also has roots
in pragmatic theories of privacy. Pragmatic theories explicitly focus on
concrete practices and conceive of privacy as a constitutive part of such
practices.90 Accordingly, they define privacy harms in terms of
disruptions to practices.91 In a similar vein, the theory of intellectual
privacy emphasizes surveillance’s ability to chill activities of intellectual
development and expression, from reading library books to web-surfing
to writing and speaking.92 These theories provide a compelling account
of the potential chilling effects of surveillance and the value of privacydependent practices. There are, however, other fundamental harms
caused by government surveillance that a Fourth Amendment normative
model must incorporate.
b)

Harm to Relationships

The second harm factor asks whether a surveillance practice would
interfere with or diminish interpersonal relationships. Surveillance
might harm such relationships by compromising intimate
communications, deterring relationship formation, or diminishing the
depth or quality of intimate relationships via the threat of observation.
Relationships with others are both extremely important to people’s

recently expressed concern about the potential for surveillance to “chill[] …
expressive freedoms.” United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 416 (2012)
(Sotomayor, J., concurring).
89 Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 84 n.23.
90 Solove, supra note 54, at 1127−30.
91 Id. at 1129. An essential characteristic of a pragmatic theory is that it
“focus[es] on the specific types of disruption and the specific practices
disrupted rather than looking for the common [theoretical] denominator that
links all of them.” Id. at 1130.
92 Richards, supra note 56, at 389, 421.
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well-being and particularly dependent on privacy to flourish.93 An
important aspect of personal relationships is “the sharing of information
about one’s actions, beliefs or emotions which one does not share with
all.”94 By protecting such personal information from general observation,
“privacy creates the moral capital which we spend in friendship and
love.”95 Surveillance can easily disrupt personal relationships by
deterring unfettered communication,96 disrupting intimacy,97 inducing
self-consciousness and self-censorship,98 or causing social embarrassment
or condemnation.99
If a surveillance technique is likely to prevent people from
expressing private, provocative, or intimate thoughts to each other, then
that would weigh in favor of finding a Fourth Amendment search.
Courts may assess a surveillance technique’s impacts on relationships by,
for instance, examining studies showing that the technique decreases or
diminishes personal communications.100 Judges can also usefully intuit
the impact of outside surveillance on relationships. The effects of
observation by others on personal communications are generally easy to
comprehend. Virtually everyone has had the experience of moderating
or ceasing a conversation due to potential overhearing by another such
as a parent, teacher, stranger, or co-worker.
The Supreme Court has not expressly analyzed interference with
personal relationships in the Fourth Amendment context, but it has
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L. REV.
919, 923–24 (2005).
94 CHARLES FRIED, AN ANATOMY OF VALUES: PROBLEMS OF PERSONAL AND SOCIAL
CHOICE 142 (1970).
95 Id.
96 Richards, supra note 56, at 424.
97 Robert S. Gerstein, Intimacy and Privacy, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF
PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY 268–69 (Ferdinand D. Schoeman ed., 1984).
98 Id.
99 James Rachels, Why Privacy Is Important, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF
PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY, at 293−96 (1984); Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as
Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REV. 119, 138−39 (2004).
100 See Carl Botan, Communication Work and Electronic Surveillance: A Model for
Predicting Panoptic Effects, 63 COMM. MONOGRAPHS 293, 307, 309–10 (1996)
(finding that workers under surveillance engaged in fewer personal
communications); R.H. Irving, et al., Computerized Performance Monitoring
Systems: Use and Abuse, 29 COMM. ACM 794, 799 (1986) (computer monitoring
was correlated with a decrease in the quality of peer relationships).
93
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repeatedly protected personal communications from government
surveillance and emphasized the importance of unfettered discourse. In
the majority opinion in Katz, the Court subjected telephone conversations
to a warrant requirement, grounding its holding in its recognition of “the
vital role that the public telephone has come to play in private
communication.”101 In one of the earliest Supreme Court Fourth
Amendment cases, the Court declared that sealed letters could not be
inspected without a search warrant.102 Recently, a Sixth Circuit case
concluded that the Fourth Amendment should generally protect the
contents of emails, lest it “prove an ineffective guardian of private
communication, an essential purpose it has long been recognized to
serve.”103 This essential purpose has been obscured to some degree by
the confusions of the Katz test, but courts continue to protect personal
communications even when current doctrine seems to suggest doing
otherwise.104
Outside of Fourth Amendment law, the Supreme Court has
recognized the importance of intimate relationships to human well-being
and has vigorously protected these relationships from unnecessary state
interference.105 Laws that might adversely affect marriages, parent-child
relationships, non-marital romantic relationships, cohabitation, and
others have been struck down as unconstitutional infringements on
intimate relationships.106 The Court’s longstanding recognition of the
importance of these relationships provides another basis for weighing

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967).
Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877).
103 Warshak v. United States, 631 F.3d 266, 287 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing United
States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972) (recognizing the Fourth
Amendment’s protection of “conversational privacy”)).
104 See id. at 287 (refusing to create a bright-line rule protecting emails and
noting that protecting emails is somewhat in tension with the reasoning of
Miller v. United States, 425 U.S. 435 (1976)).
105 Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619 (1984) (collecting cases).
106 See, e.g., Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479, 497−98 (1965) (marriage);
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) (parent-child); Carey v. Population
Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 684−86 (1977) (non-marital intimacy); Moore v. East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503−04 (1977) (plurality op.) (cohabitation); see also
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460−62 (1958) (striking
down, on due process grounds, a law likely to deter citizens from associating
with others for the purposes of advocacy).
101
102
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harm to such relationships in a normative Fourth Amendment analysis.
Intimacy and personal relationships have long been a central focus
of privacy theory, and more recent developments in surveillance theory
have specifically examined the potential for surveillance to disrupt
relationships.
Scholars have explored intimacy as an important
component of privacy since the 1970s,107 developing various accounts of
the values of private relationships and the perniciousness of judgmental
or exploitative observation.108 More recent, contextual theories of privacy
have explored the disparate norms of information flow that govern the
various relationships that we maintain.109 Surveillance can harm these
associations not only when these norms are violated and information is
spread too widely, but also when the fear of observation prevents the
communication necessary to maintain these relationships.110 Intimacy,
privacy, and communication are essential components of personal
relationships, and our understanding of the roles they play has grown
substantially in recent years.
c)

Psychological and Physical Injury

The third factor asks whether people will suffer psychological or
physical injury as a result of surveillance. The impact of surveillance goes
beyond the substantial effects it can have on people’s activities and
relationships. Even in the absence of such effects, the targets of
surveillance can suffer personal harm from the observation, judgment,
fear, and in some cases physical force associated with government
investigations.
Under this factor, evidence that a surveillance technique will likely
cause stress, depression, or physical harm would weigh in favor of Fourth
Fried, supra note, at 142; Tom Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 233, 268, 273 (1977).
108 See, e.g., JULIE C. INNESS, PRIVACY, INTIMACY, AND ISOLATION 57–58, 61–63
(1992); Gerstein, supra note 97, at 267–69.
109 Nissenbaum, supra note 99, at 138−39 (“Generally, these norms circumscribe
the type or nature of information about various individuals that, within a given
context, is allowable, expected, or even demanded to be revealed. In medical
contexts, it is appropriate to share details of our physical condition . . . among
friends we may pour over romantic entanglements . . ..”).
110 See id.
107
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Amendment protection. The injuries captured here include not only
violations of privacy but also a variety of other important harms,
including discrimination, police coercion, and physical harm.111 In many
cases, judges may be able to reason about or intuit such harms, for
instance concluding that the constant visual monitoring of a subject will
result in stress or that stop-and-frisk techniques will be associated with
aggressive physical force. There are, moreover, an increasing number of
studies and reports that demonstrate measurable psychological and
physical harms from surveillance.112
The rich and growing social science literature on the personal harms
of surveillance has been largely ignored in existing Fourth Amendment
scholarship. Yet it can provide a way for judges to concretize and
measure internal privacy harms in a normative Fourth Amendment
analysis. For example, studies of computer keystroke or telephone
monitoring and related practices have found a variety of psychological
harms suffered by the targets of surveillance, including stress, anger,
fatigue, depression, irritation, and infantilization.113 Researchers have
also measured the physical and psychosomatic harms produced by
surveillance, such as muscle pain and headaches.114 Studies of video
monitoring show that subjects feel discomfort and agitation, as well as a
feeling of being mistrusted.115 Research into stop-and-frisks and related
police investigations demonstrate that a history of police contact is
See infra Part III.C.
See infra notes 113−118 and accompanying text.
113 See, e.g., Carl Botan & Mihaela Vorvoreanu, “What Are You Really Saying to
Me?” Electronic Surveillance in the Workplace, CERIAS TECH REPORT, June 2000, at
9–10, http://www.antoniocasella.eu/nume/Botan_2000.pdf; Lawrence M.
Schleifer, et al., Mood Disturbance and Musculoskeletal Discomfort Effects of
Electronic Performance Monitoring in a VDT Data-Entry Task, at 195, in
ORGANIZATIONAL RISK FACTORS FOR JOB STRESS (Steven L. Sauter & Lawrence R.
Murphy, eds., 1995); M. J. Smith et al., Employee stress and health complaints in
jobs with and without electronic performance monitoring, 23 APPLIED ERGONOMICS
17, 21−22 (1992); Irving, supra note 100, at 799.
114 E.g., Schleifer, et al., supra note 113, at 195; Smith et al., supra note 113, at
21−22.
115 Emmeline Taylor, I spy with my little eye: the use of CCTV in schools and the
impact of privacy, 58 SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 381, 391−93 (2010); see also MIKE
MCCAHILL, THE SURVEILLANCE WEB: THE RISE OF VISUAL SURVEILLANCE IN AN
ENGLISH CITY 15–16 (2002) (discussing the discriminatory harms that CCTV
facilitates).
111
112
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correlated with higher anxiety and stress, while stop-and-frisk frequency
and invasiveness is correlated with symptoms of PTSD.116 Studies of
civilians subjected to consent searches of their vehicles reported
persistent negative thoughts and attitudes about the encounter, and
feelings of violation and bitterness.117 These reports can be augmented
with the numerous studies in which respondents rate the perceived
invasiveness of various surveillance practices including location tracking,
social media monitoring, and internet data collection.118 Together, these
studies constitute a detailed and wide-ranging account of the internal
harms of surveillance.
This is not to say that every surveillance technique found to cause
stress or discomfort in a study should be considered a search. Rather,
these and similar studies can help to quantify the harms of surveillance
and are accordingly relevant to the question of the Fourth Amendment’s
scope. The fact that a surveillance technique is linked to stress or pain is
just one factor of several in the proposed normative test, and the relevant
social science will rarely be definitive in any event. Moreover, not every
Amanda Geller, et al., Aggressive Policing and the Mental Health of Young
Urban Men, 104 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2321, 2323−24 (2014); Abigail A. Sewell, et
al., Living under surveillance: Gender, psychological distress, and stop-question-andfrisk policing in New York City, 159 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1, 2, 6−7 (2016).
117 Janice Nadler, No Need to Shout: Bus Sweeps and the Psychology of
Coercion, 2002 Sup. Ct. Rev. 153, 212−13. One responded noted that the police
encounter produced “an empty feeling, like you’re nothing.” Id. at 212.
Another said, “I feel really violated … I feel really bitter about the whole thing.
Id.
118 Yongick Jeong & Erin Coyle, What are you Worrying About on Facebook and
Twitter? An Empirical Investigation of Young Social Network Site Users’ Privacy
Perceptions and Behaviors, 14 J. INTERACTIVE ADVERTISING 51, 55 (2014); Matthew
Tokson, Automation and the Fourth Amendment, 96 IOWA L. REV. 581, 622–26
(2011); Laurel A. McNall & Jeffrey M. Stanton, Private Eyes are Watching You:
Reactions to Location Sensing Technologies, 26 J. Bus. Pscyh. 299, 304 (2011);
Christopher Slobogin, Government Data Mining and the Fourth Amendment, 75 U.
CHI. L. REV. 317, 335 (2008); TAMARA DINEV, ET AL., Internet privacy concerns and
beliefs about government surveillance—An empirical investigation, 17 J. STRATEGIC
INFO. SYS. 214, 223 (2008); Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy: Camera
Surveillance of Public Places and the Right to Anonymity, 72 MISS. L. J. 213, 275-76
(2002); Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of
Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at
“Understandings Recognized and Permitted by Society”, 42 DUKE L.J. 727, 737−38,
tbl. 1. (1993).
116
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surveillance situation confronted by courts will have been addressed in
an existing study of surveillance’s concrete harms.
Yet courts can usefully test their intuitions about the harms caused
by surveillance against the available evidence, taking such evidence into
account as they have a in a wide variety of constitutional and other cases,
including Brown v. Board of Education,119 Roper v. Simmons,120 and countless
others.121 Courts can also draw useful comparisons between known
surveillance harms and those likely to be suffered in analogous cases.
Moreover, judges and juries already conduct a somewhat similar inquiry
in personal injury cases, where they assess damages for psychological
pain and suffering.122

3.

Less Invasive Means

Finally, the normative test incorporates a requirement that courts
consider whether there is a less invasive practice that could reveal
roughly the same information as the challenged practice. If a surveillance
technique is invasive or affects an entire population, and a feasible
alternative could obtain the same information in a less invasive or more
targeted way, that would weigh in favor of finding a Fourth Amendment
search. If alternative techniques would not be as effective or would be
347 U.S. 483, 494 n.11 (1954).
543 U.S. 551, 569–70 (2005).
121 See, e.g., Riley v. California, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 2489–91 (2014); Graham v. Fla.,
560 U.S. 48, 68–69, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026–27 (2010); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497
U.S. 417, 469–70 (1990); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41,
50–52 (1986). Social science and other scientific research is also routinely
analyzed in administrative law cases. See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly,
533 U.S. 525, 559–60 (2001).
122 Tokson, supra note 10, at 199; see Sean Hannon Williams, Self-Altering Injury:
The Hidden Harms of Hedonic Adaptation, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 535, 543–44 & n.42
(2011) (collecting cases involving hedonic damages). The inquiry proposed here
would likely be substantially easier, as the psychological harm from
surveillance need only be situated somewhere on the general scale from low to
high and would not have to be translated into a precise money value. Fact
finders tend to be far more consistent in performing the former calculation than
the latter. Cass R. Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages (with Notes on
Cognition and Valuation in Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071, 2097−2103 & tbl.1 (1998)
(finding that mock jurors assessing various hypothetical cases tend to give
consistent rankings of blameworthiness but very different damages awards).
119
120
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prohibitively costly, that would weigh against finding a search.
Courts currently apply a similar, albeit stricter, standard in cases
involving the Wiretap Act, which directs the government to show that it
has attempted less invasive surveillance before applying for a wiretap.123
In Fourth Amendment law, the Supreme Court has expressly considered
the availability of less invasive means when assessing the
constitutionality of conducting blood tests on suspected drunk drivers.124
This factor is also based in part on the intermediate scrutiny test in free
speech law, which directs courts to approve restrictions on certain types
of speech only if the restrictions do not burden substantially more speech
than is necessary to serve a significant government interest.125 Similarly,
the existence here of a potentially less restrictive alternative would not
definitively render a surveillance technique unlawful, but it would be a
factor that favors applying a warrant requirement.126

D. Omitted Factors
The proposed test, like any Fourth Amendment test, cannot
incorporate every potential surveillance harm or every abstract Fourth
Amendment value without devolving into a “totality of the
circumstances” standard. Accordingly, the test does not analyze every
circumstance or examine every theory that might bear on the normative
assessment of a surveillance practice. Conceptually, it emphasizes
pragmatic and contextual theories of surveillance rather than more
abstract theories that center on control over information, autonomy, or
personality development.127 The latter theories operate at too high a level
See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c) (2012); United States v. Carter, 449 F.3d 1287, 1293
(D.C. Cir. 2006).
124 Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2184, (2016) (holding that police
officers cannot warrantlessly conduct blood tests incident to arrest because
“[b]lood tests are significantly more intrusive [than breath tests], and their
reasonableness must be judged in light of the availability of the less invasive
alternative of a breath test”).
125 See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989).
126 See Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989)
(explaining that intermediate scrutiny requires only a reasonable fit between
means and ends, and does not require that the government select the least
restrictive means possible).
127 E.g., Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 482 (1968) (defining privacy as
123
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of abstraction to be useful in a legal test. The normative approach
proposed here focuses on the more concrete harms of surveillance in
order to remain workable for judges and capable of consistent
application.
Yet the test’s focus on foregone activities and the psychological
harms of surveillance can also capture many of the concerns that drive
the more abstract theories of privacy. Consider theories of privacy and
autonomy, which focus on the need to preserve a private zone within
which individuals can develop and choose free of social coercion.128 Such
coercion can cause the targets of surveillance to conform their behavior
to perceived social norms by foregoing legitimate but potentially
embarrassing activities.129 And the social pressures inherent in many
forms of surveillance can result in psychological stress and harm.130
These foregone activities and psychological harms would be captured by
the normative test. Likewise, the test’s consideration of physical harms
resulting from police investigatory activity is in accord with theories of
privacy that focus on bodily integrity and personal dignity.131 These
more abstract values are captured at least in part by the proposed test,
even though they are not overtly included.
In any event, the impossibility of capturing every surveillance harm
in a single test mirrors the impossibility of capturing every facet of law
enforcement benefit. Both the deterrence effects and the retributivist
values served by law enforcement are unlikely to be fully captured, for
instance. Any workable balancing test will elide some quantum of harm
and benefit on both sides. One of the virtues of such tests is that they
typically leave out far less than other types of legal standards.132
The normative test also reflects a variety of the more abstract Fourth

“the control we have over information about ourselves”); Anita L. Allen,
Coercing Privacy, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 723, 738 (1999) (“Privacy has value
relative to normative conceptions of spiritual personality, political freedom,
health and welfare, human dignity, and autonomy.”).
128 See Cohen, supra note 48, at 1377, 1424.
129 Richards, supra note 56, at 403–04; Julie E. Cohen, Privacy, Visibility,
Transparency, and Exposure, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 181, 186 (2008).
130 See supra Section I.C.2.c.
131 See, e.g., Radhika Rao, Property, Privacy, and the Human Body, 80 B.U. L. REV.
359, 388 (2000).
132 See infra Part III.A.
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Amendment values identified by courts and scholars, such as privacy,
liberty, or security.133 One advantage of a pragmatic approach is that the
practical harms of surveillance are often common denominators among
the various abstract theories of Fourth Amendment principles.134 Indeed,
to the extent that courts and historians have identified a single general
purpose of the Fourth Amendment, that purpose is itself more functional
than abstract: to protect citizens from arbitrary government intrusions.135
Given this shared practical foundation, it is unsurprising that the various
theories of Fourth Amendment values overlap more than they conflict.136
The common functional goals of these various theories, at least as they
relate to Fourth Amendment “searches,” are largely captured by the
proposed test.137

II. DOCTRINAL AND THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FOURTH
AMENDMENT BALANCING
See Christopher Slobogin, A Defense of Privacy as the Central Value Protected by
the Fourth Amendment’s Prohibition on Unreasonable Searches, 48 TEX. TECH. L.
REV. 143, 157–62 (2015) (collecting studies identifying different but closely
related Fourth Amendment principles).
134 See, e.g., Thomas P. Crocker, From Privacy to Liberty: The Fourth Amendment
After Lawrence, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1, 18 (2009) (discussing state intrusions on
same-sex intimacy and noting the link between principles of liberty and the
protection of intimate relationships); Radhika Rao, Reconceiving Privacy:
Relationships and Reproductive Technology, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1077, 1101–07 (1998)
(discussing state intrusions on private decisions surrounding relationships and
arguing that the right of privacy is fundamentally a right of protection of
personal relationships).
135 See, e.g., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 266 (1990) (“[T]he
purpose of the Fourth Amendment was to protect the people of the United
States against arbitrary action by their own Government”); Wolf v. Colorado,
338 U.S. 25, 28–29 (1949) (holding that the Fourth Amendment’s protection
against arbitrary intrusion by the police is part of the Due Process guaranteed
by the Fourteenth Amendment); Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original
Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 556 (1999) (discussing “the larger
purpose for which the Framers adopted the text; namely to curb the exercise of
discretionary authority by officers”).
136 John D. Castiglione, Human Dignity Under the Fourth Amendment, 2008 WIS. L.
REV. 655, 675 (2008); Slobogin, supra note 133, at 152–54.
137 The Fourth Amendment also protects against unreasonable “seizures,” a
separate prohibition than the one addressed here and one that embodies the
values of protection of property and freedom from arrest.
133
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In setting out the normative model, the previous Part discussed some
of the legal and theoretical foundations of its factors. This Part briefly
examines doctrinal, historical, and theoretical support for a normative
balancing approach in general. The Fourth Amendment’s text and its
broader purposes are consistent with the balancing of law enforcement
benefits against the costs of surveillance. The language and history of the
Amendment evince a concern with effective law enforcement as well as
citizen privacy. Moreover, both the leading originalist interpretation of
the Amendment and less formalist theories of construction point to a
balancing approach.

A. The Fourth Amendment’s Balance
Balancing is inherent in Fourth Amendment law, as reflected in the
Amendment’s history, language, and purposes. The very concept of
warrants supported by “probable cause”138 contemplates a balancing
between law enforcement interests and citizen privacy. The government
can obtain a search warrant only if it has sufficient cause to believe the
search will uncover a crime. Once the government has sufficient cause,
it can search citizens and their property despite the considerable harms
to privacy and liberty that might result. Indeed, the police can enter the
house of a totally innocent person to arrest a criminal or seize contraband
possessed by a houseguest.139 Neither the interests of individuals in
avoiding government intrusions nor the interests of law enforcement are
absolute.
Founding-era practices likewise evinced a non-absolutist approach
to searches and seizures. Unlawful searches were addressed with civil
liability rather than the exclusion of evidence.140 The trespass actions that
provided a basis for Fourth Amendment protection were themselves
tempered by doctrines of necessity, which allowed trespasses when

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
See Steagald v. United States 451 U.S. 204, 213, 222 (1981) (stating that the
police could enter the house of an innocent third party to arrest a felon if they
had a search warrant or probable cause and exigency).
140 See, e.g., Entick v. Carrington, (1765) 19 Howell’s State Trials (C.B.).
138
139
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necessary to prevent public or private harm.141 Unwarranted invasions
were generally excused if contraband was discovered.142 In each
situation, citizens’ protections against government intrusions were
counterweighted by other values and defeasible in cases involving
probable cause, public or private necessity, or actual guilt.
The balancing inherent in Fourth Amendment law does not dictate
that courts must balance when examining the scope of the Amendment—
perhaps balancing should be confined to other aspects of Fourth
Amendment law, or eschewed altogether.143 But a normative balancing
test for scope is consistent with the structure and traditional practice of
the Fourth Amendment.

B. Text, Originalism, and Determinacy
The Fourth Amendment prohibits “unreasonable searches,” a phrase
that is not defined and is susceptible to a wide variety of meanings.144 The
dominant view of the Fourth Amendment is that its text and history are
of little or no help in determining its scope.145 Yet a number of scholars
contend that the scope of the Amendment is determinable by reference to
the original public meaning of the relevant phrase.146
See, e.g., Campbell v. Race, 61 Mass. 408, 410−11 (1851) (collecting American
and English sources describing the common law rule that encroachment on
private property was permitted when a highway becomes impassable);
Mouse’s Case, (1608) 77 Eng. Rep. 1341 (K.B.) 1342; 12 Co. Rep. 64 (property
may be trespassorily destroyed if necessary to save lives).
142 See, e.g., Gelston v. Hoyt, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 246, 310 (1818); Akhil Reed
Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 767 (1994)
(collecting sources).
143 See discussion infra Part IV.C.
144 See Matthew Tokson, Blank Slates, 59 B.C. L. REV. 591, 627−30 (2018).
145 See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, The Curious History of Fourth Amendment Searches, 2012
SUP. CT. REV. 67, 70; Amsterdam, supra note 3, at 395.
146 See, e.g., Brief of Scholars of the History and Original Meaning of the Fourth
Amendment as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 3, Carpenter v. United
States, 138 S.Ct. 2206 (2018) (No. 16-402), 2017 WL 3530961 [hereinafter
Originalist Scholars Amicus Brief]; DAVID GRAY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN
AN AGE OF SURVEILLANCE 251 (2017); Amar, supra note 142, at 767. There are
other forms of originalist interpretation, including “original methods
originalism,” which recommend interpreting the Constitution by reference to
the methods of legal interpretation used at the time of the Founding. See, e.g.,
141
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This Article does not undertake to resolve this debate, because it
need not resolve it—both major views of the determinism of the Fourth
Amendment’s text are consistent with the normative balancing approach.
Indeed, both counsel weighing the harms of surveillance against law
enforcement justifications in order to determine which investigations the
police can perform without any quantifiable suspicion. This section
explores theories regarding the determinacy of the Fourth Amendment
and shows how they provide further support for Fourth Amendment
balancing.
1.

Fourth Amendment Searches as Textually
Determinate

Several Fourth Amendment scholars have argued that the term
“search” in the context of the Fourth Amendment gives specific guidance
as to the scope of the Amendment.147 They contend that the Amendment
applies to any “search” in the broadest sense of that term, meaning any
act of seeking, gathering information, or looking at something.148 Thus a
government official looking at a house or a crowd of people would be
conducting a warrantless Fourth Amendment search.149 Many such
searches would be lawful, however, because they would be
“reasonable.”150 Reasonableness would no longer require a warrant
supported by probable cause as a default rule, but would be a more
general inquiry into whether a search had a “good and sufficient
justification” and was not “greater than is fit” or “immoderate.”151
Although the reasonableness inquiry is an amorphous, “common sense”

John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A
New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 N.W. U.
L. Rev. 751, 786−87 (2009). The predominant originalist approach in the Fourth
Amendment context focuses on original public meaning, and that is the
approach discussed in this section.
147 See supra note 146.
148 Amar, supra note 142, at 768−69; GRAY, supra note 146, at 251; Originalist
Scholars Amicus Brief, supra note 146, at 6−7.
149 See, e.g., Amar, supra note 142, at 768; Originalist Scholars Amicus Brief,
supra note 146, at 13.
150 Amar, supra note 142, at 769.
151 Originalist Scholars Amicus Brief, supra note 146, at 14–15.
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sort of analysis,152 it would consider how intrusive a search is153 and
whether the search is excessive in light of its justifications.154
This interpretation of the Fourth Amendment is notably consistent
with the balancing approach proposed in Part I. Both approaches would
resolve the question of when the government can engage in warrantless
surveillance by making a normative inquiry to determine whether such
surveillance is justified. There are differences, of course. This Article’s
approach is more specific and less reliant on distant historical analogy
than the originalist approaches.155 It would also conduct its balancing at
the scope stage rather than the reasonableness stage of a Fourth
Amendment case, preserving the longstanding role of warrants and
probable cause in regulating police behavior. The warrant requirement,
unlike the Katz test, has not come under widespread attack by scholars or
commentators.156 Indeed, many have argued for strengthening the
requirement by limiting its various exceptions, and empirical data
indicates that warranted searches are far more likely than unwarranted
probable-cause searches to actually produce evidence of crime.157 The
Amar, supra note 142, at 801.
Id.
154 Originalist Scholars Amicus Brief, supra note 146, at 15. Note that this is not
the only originalist interpretation of Fourth Amendment reasonableness. Laura
Donohue has argued that “unreasonable” in the Fourth Amendment’s text
refers to something “against the reason of the common law,” including
warrantless entry into a home. See Laura Donohue, The Original Fourth
Amendment, 83 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1181, 1192 (2016). This approach to Fourth
Amendment reasonableness would be less consistent with the normative
balancing approach proposed above, and would likely be more focused on
government actions violating the common law.
155 Cf. Originalist Scholars Amicus Brief, supra note 146, at 3−4 (analyzing cell
phone signal data collection by reference to the general warrants cases of the
pre-Founding era).
156 Cf. CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT
SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 44−45 (2007) (suggesting that
courts preserve ex ante review but advocating for the issuance of warrants on
less than probable cause.
157 See, e.g., Phyllis T. Bookspan, Reworking the Warrant Requirement:
Resuscitating the Fourth Amendment, 44 VAND. L. REV. 473, 481 (1991); Wayne D.
Holly, The Fourth Amendment Hangs in the Balance: Resurrecting the Warrant
Requirement Through Strict Scrutiny, 13 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 531, 531 (1997);
Max Minzner, Putting Probability Back into Probable Cause, 87 TEX. L. REV. 913,
923−25 (2009).
152
153
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normative test would avoid overturning more than a century of warrantrequirement precedents and undermining effective ex ante judicial
review of police surveillance.158 But the inquiry would be conceptually
similar to the originalist inquiry, and it would make little difference to a
police officer whether looking at a house without probable cause is lawful
because it is not regulated by the Fourth Amendment or because it is
“reasonable.”159 The normative test proposed here is congruous with the
predominant originalist interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.160
2.

Fourth Amendment Searches as Textually
Indeterminate

The majority of scholars who have written on the Fourth
Amendment’s scope consider its text and history to be indeterminate, or
at best profoundly underdeterminate.161 Not only is the term “search”
ambiguous and capable of multiple meanings,162 but the Supreme Court’s

See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); Perlman v. United States,
247 U.S. 7 (1918); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932); Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984); Bond v.
United States, 529 U.S. 334 (2000); Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482
(2014).
159 See Amar, supra note 142, at 769.
160 Indeed, to the extent that originalism incorporates values of stare decisis, the
normative test may be the optimal originalist approach because it avoids
overturning longstanding precedents. See supra note 158.
161 See supra note 145. For a discussion of underdeterminacy and construction
in legal interpretation, see Lawrence B. Solum, 82 Fordham L. Rev. 453, 458
(2013). Some originalist scholars have argued that underdeterminate text can
be clarified by reference to the spirit of the constitutional provision at issue, i.e.
its original function or purpose. Randy E. Barnett & Evan Bernick, The Letter
and the Spirit: A Unified Theory of Originalism, 107 Geo. L.J. 1, 3 (2018). In this
context, the generally acknowledged purposes of the Fourth Amendment are
fairly abstract and may not substantially clarify the scope of the Fourth
Amendment. See Tokson, supra note 144, at 635 & n.279 (noting that historians
generally consider the “bedrock purpose of the Fourth Amendment” to be the
protection of “privacy, property, and liberty from undue intrusions by
government officers,” and quoting several historians). Assuming historians are
correct that a core purpose of the Amendment was to protect values like
privacy and liberty against government oppression, the test proposed here is
likely congruent with an original-purpose-based approach.
162 Kerr, supra note 145, at 628.
158
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time-honored interpretation of “reasonable” as typically requiring a
warrant or at least some articulable suspicion means that not every
investigative act can be a search.163 The crucial question of when the
police can conduct suspicionless surveillance is not answered in the text
or history.164
What should courts do when addressing an indeterminate law?
General theories of legal indeterminacy typically conceive of judges who
fill legal gaps as acting in a legislative capacity and attempting to reach
optimal outcomes via a normative-style inquiry.165 This inquiry might
entail the consideration of moral values, policy judgments, or personal
experiences.166
Judges might accordingly weigh these types of
considerations in addressing the Fourth Amendment’s scope in the
absence of formal guidance. These broad prescriptions do not mandate a
balancing test, but they are certainly consistent with the use of normative
balancing when addressing indeterminate law.
Further, theories of indeterminacy that focus on how courts should
formulate legal tests in the absence of determinate law directly support
the use of a balancing test in the Fourth Amendment context. The issue
of the Fourth Amendment’s scope is normatively complex, covers a wide
variety of government conduct, and has been repeatedly destabilized by
technological and social change.167 Alternative, non-balancing standards
may therefore fail to capture the fundamental values underlying the
issue, and may not be much simpler to apply than a direct balancing
test.168 Moreover, courts are increasingly likely to be able to obtain the
Tokson, supra note 144, at 640.
Id. at 628–29.
165 See, e.g., JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 197–99 (1979); Thomas W.
Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 43 (1985).
Ronald Dworkin takes a philosophically different approach to doctrinal
indeterminacy that ultimately offers similar advice. See RONALD DWORKIN,
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 124, 128 (1977) (describing the central role of political
and personal convictions in Dworkinian adjudication). Dworkin argues that
judges should address difficult legal questions by choosing the outcome that
fits best with the overarching narrative or theory of law and with political
morality. Id. at 107; RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 138–43 (1985).
166 See MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 148 (1988);
DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 38 (2010); RICHARD A. POSNER,
HOW JUDGES THINK 82–83, 106–08 (2008).
167 Tokson, supra note 144, at 614–15, 643–44.
168 Id. at 644–45; Cloud, supra note 3, at 28–36.
163
164
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information they need to effectively balance in the Fourth Amendment
context.169 In such a situation, a balancing test is likely to be the optimal
approach for courts faced with legal indeterminacy.170 General theories
of legal indeterminacy are consistent with a normative balancing
approach, and more detailed theories directly support such an approach.

III. THE CASE FOR A NORMATIVE BALANCING MODEL
The previous Parts have set out a normative balancing model for the
Fourth Amendment’s scope, traced the lineage of its various factors, and
given an account of its doctrinal, historical, and theoretical foundations.
This Part details its more practical advantages: directness, adaptability to
social and technological change, inclusion of non-privacy harms,
harmonization of doctrine with practice, and applicability to broad
surveillance programs. These benefits are substantial. Indeed, in a
society where surveillance technology consistently advances and
expectations of privacy continually shrink, these benefits may be
indispensable.

A. Directness
A prominent advantage of the normative balancing approach is that
it directly addresses the normative values at issue. Courts need not use
“false targets” or proxies that stand in for essential Fourth Amendment
interests—they would examine those interests directly. If judges can
administer a balancing test effectively, then its outcomes should
maximize societal welfare relative to other tests.
Tokson, supra note 144, at 645. See generally Daniel J. Solove & Danielle Keats
Citron, Risk and Anxiety: A Theory of Data Breach Harms, 96 TEX. L. REV. 737, 773–
77 (2018) (discussing how courts might quantify damages from privacy
breaches); Christopher Slobogin, Government Data Mining and the Fourth
Amendment, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 317, 335 (2008) (setting out the average perceived
intrusiveness of various types of searches); Kathryn J. Kolb & John R. Aiello,
Electronic Performance Monitoring and Social Context: Impact on Productivity and
Stress, 80 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 339, 339 (1995) (studying stress among the targets
of surveillance).
170 Tokson, supra note 144, at 613–16.
169
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Of course, the other side of this coin is that balancing tests are
generally difficult to administer, as discussed below.171 But a balancing
approach is likely to be more effective than a narrower standard in this
context. Because the question of the Fourth Amendment’s scope is
conceptually complex, broad, and subject to constant disruption by new
technologies, it is unlikely that a narrow standard can effectively capture
the fundamental values at stake.172 A balancing test, though hardly
without drawbacks, avoids this fatal error.
Relatedly, the normative approach embodies the balance that is
inherent in the Fourth Amendment.173 It squarely addresses the purposes
of the Fourth Amendment, directly assessing the harms of arbitrary
government intrusions and the practical values of security, liberty, and
privacy.174 It hews far more closely to traditional Fourth Amendment
goals than does, for instance, the Katz test, which focuses on current
societal expectations about privacy.

B. Adaptability to Social and Technological Change
The normative approach is especially adaptable to new
circumstances and new surveillance technologies. It looks to law
enforcement benefits and practical privacy harms, no matter how those
benefits and harms may manifest in a given surveillance context.
Alternative tests are often more rigid and prone to destabilization by
changing circumstances.
Changes in surveillance practices and technologies have, for
instance, repeatedly undermined narrower Fourth Amendment tests in
the past. In the early 20th century, the Supreme Court held that the
Fourth Amendment’s protections were limited to the specific types of
property enumerated in the “persons, houses, papers, and effects” clause
of the Amendment.175 This property-based approach exposed telephone
and other conversations to pervasive government monitoring, leading to

See infra Part IV.A.1.
See supra Part II.B.2.
173 See supra Part II.A.
174 See supra note 57.
175 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928).
171
172
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egregious privacy violations and political abuses.176
The Court
eventually adopted the Katz test, which expanded the Fourth
Amendment’s coverage to intangible things and based it on expectations
of privacy. Yet the Katz test has itself been rapidly destabilized as threats
to privacy proliferate, knowledge of such threats gradually spreads, and
the cost-per-citizen of surveillance drops precipitously.177 In a society
where the government can collect huge databases of personal
information held by commercial third parties,178 engage in constant visual
monitoring via drones or satellites,179 or mine email metadata to reveal
intimate details about people’s lives,180 the concept of an expectation of
privacy not grounded in legal protections is increasingly obsolete.
Adaptability is especially important given the outsized role that
social and technological change plays in Fourth Amendment law. A
normative balancing approach allows courts to take account of a novel
surveillance context without depending on societal expectations or
waiting for Congress to pass a law—a wait that might take decades.181
The normative test is resilient to the changes that have undermined
previous and current Fourth Amendment tests.

C. Discrimination-Based Harms
Many of the harms of surveillance are related to the loss of privacy
See, e.g., 2 Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, 183-84, 198−201 (GPO 1976).
177 See Tokson, supra note 10, at 181−87.
178 E.g., Chris J. Hoofnagle, Big Brother's Little Helper: How Choicepoint and Other
Commercial Data Brokers Collect and Package your Data for Law Enforcement, 29
N.C. J. INT’L. L. & COM. REG. 595, 635-37 (2004).
179 Robert Draper, They are Watching You—and Everything Else on the Planet,
NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Feb. 2018),
https://www.nationalgeographic.com/magazine/2018/02/surveillancewatching-you.
180 Barton Gellman & Ashkan Soltani, NSA Collects Millions of E-mail Address
Books Globally, WASH. POST (Oct. 14, 2013),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-collectsmillions-of-e-mail-address-books-globally/2013/10/14/8e58b5be-34f9-11e380c6-7e6dd8d22d8f_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.12c9a3e97eb8.
181 The Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”) has not yet been
meaningfully updated since it became law in 1986, despite massive advances
and changes in email technology. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2516, 2703.
176
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that occurs when a subject is observed by others. But the Katz test’s
exclusive focus on informational privacy fails to capture some of the most
harmful aspects of government surveillance: discrimination, coercion,
intimidation, and physical harm.182 Routine police encounters on public
sidewalks or roads, for instance, may have little impact on informational
privacy but nonetheless may harm individuals through coercion or the
threat of violence.183 The normative test takes a broader view of Fourth
Amendment privacy and protection, one that considers the personal
harms of surveillance whether they arise from observation or from more
direct tactics of intimidation or coercion.184
Non-privacy harms may be especially important when surveillance
reflects discrimination against certain groups or otherwise expresses
societal condemnation of surveillance targets. State surveillance can have
a powerful expressive component, conveying the message that its targets
are low status members of society, unworthy of trust, or inherently
dangerous.185 Discrimination itself, including discrimination associated
with police practices, can cause serious short-term psychological and
physical effects including stress, depression, elevated heart rate, and high
blood pressure.186 Over the long term, such discrimination is correlated
with a variety of health problems such as heart attacks and strokes.187
Surveillance programs that target or disproportionately affect a particular
demographic group may cause serious harms to individuals that should
be taken into account in a Fourth Amendment analysis. The normative
test allows courts to directly consider such harms when assessing a
government surveillance practice.

D. Harmonizing Practice and Doctrine
Stuntz, supra note 6, at 1065–66.
Id.
184 See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
185 See Craig Konnoth, An Expressive Theory of Privacy Intrusions, 102 IOWA L.
REV. 1533, 1563−68 (2017).
186 See, e.g., Abigail A. Sewell & Kevin A. Jefferson, Collateral Damage: The Health
Effects of Invasive Police Encounters in New York City, 93 J. URBAN HEALTH 542,
543 (2016); Pamela J. Sawyer, et al., Discrimination and the Stress Response:
Psychological and Physiological Consequences of Anticipating Prejudice in Interethnic
Interactions, 102 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1020 (2012).
187 See Sawyer, et al., supra note 174, at 1020.
182
183
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The Katz test directs courts to assess society’s expectations of privacy,
and many courts faithfully attempt to do so. Lower courts especially tend
to address novel Fourth Amendment scope questions by attempting to
calculate societal knowledge and expectations about surveillance
practices.188 The Supreme Court frequently does the same, looking
explicitly to our “everyday expectations of privacy”189 and what people
“typically know”190 in determining the scope of the Fourth
Amendment.191 The results and reasoning of such cases are frequently
criticized, but we might at least admire these courts’ fidelity to governing
precedent.192
Yet many Fourth Amendment cases, especially at the Supreme Court
level, appear to be driven by normative concerns rather than doctrinal
ones.193 Consider the third-party doctrine, which states that people waive
their Fourth Amendment rights in things that they voluntarily disclose to
a third party. This infamous doctrine threatens privacy in a vast swath
of personal data in the internet age. Yet, even before it was expressly
limited in Carpenter v. United States,194 the third-party doctrine has seemed
to disappear whenever it would produce a particularly unjust outcome.195
In a typical third-party doctrine case, exposure of something to a third
See Tokson, supra note, at 154, 156−58, 161−63 (describing numerous
examples of lower courts attempting to assess the extent of societal knowledge
in order to determine societal expectations of privacy).
189 Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 98 (1990).
190 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743 (1979).
191 See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338−39 (2000); California v.
Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988); California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392
(1985).
192 See, e.g., SLOBOGIN, supra note 156, at 151−64 (2007); Lewis R. Katz, In Search
of a Fourth Amendment for the Twenty-First Century, 65 IND. L.J. 549, 564-66
(1990).
193 See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 2206, 2236 (2018) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting); Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN.
L. REV. 503, 519 (2007).
194 See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976) (holding that bank
records were not protected by the Fourth Amendment because they are
exposed to bank employees in the ordinary course of business).
195 Neil Richards notes a similar phenomenon in Richards, supra note 32, at
1468−73, contending that the Supreme Court was always more concerned with
the unrevealing nature of the information at issue in the third-party doctrine
cases than with the fact of disclosure to third parties.
188
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party’s employees eliminates Fourth Amendment protection in that
thing.196 Yet in Ferguson v. City of Charleston, the Court held that a state
hospital’s program of surreptitiously testing patients’ urine for cocaine
violated the Fourth Amendment, despite the fact that patients voluntarily
turned over their urine to hospital employees.197 And the Court held in
Stoner v. California that the police must obtain a search warrant to enter a
hotel room despite the fact that “maids, janitors, or repairmen” routinely
enter and observe the room in the normal course of business.198 Recently,
in Carpenter, several dissenting Justices reasonably complained that the
court’s decision to extend the Fourth Amendment to cell phone location
data appeared driven by normative considerations rather than the literal
Katz test.199 Policy considerations, rather than societal expectations, seem
to dictate the outcomes of several other Fourth Amendment cases as
well.200 Indeed, they appear to drive the outcomes of some cases that
purport to turn on neutral concepts like trespass and property.201
The normative test directs courts to give an account of the core
normative considerations that appear to drive a substantial portion of the
Supreme Court’s cases. It would have the benefit of making the Court’s
actual rationales for its decisions visible and subject to scrutiny. When
the Supreme Court reaches an essentially normative decision but
obscures its reasoning behind one Katz doctrine or another, observers are
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976).
Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 84–85 (2001). The court granted
certiorari only on the issue of whether the testing fit within the special needs
exception and assumed a lack of patient consent, but the dissenting Justices
noted that the patients’ consent was obvious and provided a clear basis to
resolve the case. Id. at 76; id. at 92−96 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
198 Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 489 (1964).
199 Carpenter, 138 S.Ct. at 2236 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting); id. at 2265
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
200 See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005) (holding that dog sniffs for
contraband are not searches regardless of people’s expectations of privacy);
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984) (holding that testing substances
for contraband is not a search); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984)
(expressly considering the benefits and costs of permitting warrantless searches
of prison cells); Kerr, supra note 193, at 519−22.
201 See Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 7–10 (2013), (finding a Fourth Amendment
search under the Jones trespass test despite the absence of a trespass, based
largely on novel claims about the social norms that govern approaching a
doorstep).
196
197
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less able to predict future cases, detect judicial bias, or understand
existing law. The normative test would better align the outcomes of
Fourth Amendment cases with their actual rationales, promoting
transparency and judicial credibility.

E.

Aggregation and Spillover

The normative test would help courts to address the Fourth
Amendment issues raised by aggregated programs of surveillance.
Wide-ranging surveillance programs can yield massive databases of
citizens’ information. These vast collections of data can be analyzed to
reveal far more than would be revealed by any single act of
investigation.202 Aggregated surveillance programs are increasingly
problematic as the cost-per-citizen of surveillance and analysis decreases.
Current Fourth Amendment approaches are largely blind to the
dangers of aggregate surveillance. Courts have rightly been criticized for
their transactional, non-systematic approach to Fourth Amendment
questions.203 Although courts occasionally look to the future impacts of
their decisions, they generally assess each investigatory act in isolation
rather than considering surveillance programs as a whole.204 This is
problematic because, in practice, Fourth Amendment decisions that
permit the government to surveil one specific individual effectively grant
the government the power to surveil citizens en masse. In several
situations, the government has done just that. The Supreme Court’s
holding that the government may collect Michael Lee Smith’s dialed
telephone numbers justified the NSA’s collection of millions of citizens’
dialed phone numbers and the DEA’s decades-long program of collecting
telephone metadata on all calls from the United States to other
countries.205 The Court’s holding that the address information on a postal
Renan, supra note 65, at 1056.
Renan, supra note 65, at 1053; Barry Friedman & Cynthia Benin Stein,
Redefining What's “Reasonable”: The Protections for Policing, 84 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 281, 298 (2016).
204 Renan, supra note 65, at 1053. At times, Fourth Amendment analyses are
overtly narrow, for example, looking to the specific terms of a particular
defendant’s privacy policy. United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 287 (6th Cir.
2010).
205 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745–46 (1979); see Renan, supra note 65, at
202
203
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letter is unprotected by the Fourth Amendment eventually became the
basis for a government program of scanning every mailed envelope into
a massive database of postal communications.206 These aggregate
programs of surveillance have a capacity to infringe on citizens’ privacy
that is greater than the sum of their parts, and they raise questions that
the Court does not even contemplate under traditional Fourth
Amendment tests.207
The normative test is better suited for addressing widespread
surveillance and the collection of large databases of citizens’ personal
information. It directs courts to assess surveillance at a programmatic
level, under the presumption that the government will pursue
unregulated surveillance as broadly as resource constraints allow, as it
has repeatedly done in the modern era.208 Thus it has the benefit of
aligning courts’ assessments with the likely consequences of their
decisions.
A related problem in Fourth Amendment law is that of spillover,
meaning, among other things, that information collected for one purpose
may later be used for other, more invasive or problematic purposes.209
For instance, section 702 of FISA authorizes intelligence agencies to
monitor the phone calls and electronic communications of non-U.S.
persons.210 But the intelligence program also collects the data and
communications of U.S. citizens communicating with non-U.S. citizens.211
This information is then accessible by the FBI for domestic law
enforcement purposes, and the FBI uses it “[w]ith some frequency” for

1055.
206 Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877); Ron Nixon, Report Reveals Wider
Tracking of Mail in U.S., NEW YORK TIMES (Oct. 27, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/28/us/us-secretly-monitoring-mail-ofthousands.html.
207 See Renan, supra note 65, at 1056.
208 See infra notes 205−206. See also Renan, supra note 65, at 1059 (discussing
uses of license plate scanning to monitor people’s movements).
209 See id. at 1060−67.
210 See, e.g., Erin Kelly, What is the Section 702 surveillance program and why should
you care?, USA Today, Jan. 11, 2018, available at
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2018/01/11/what-section702-surveillance-program-and-why-should-you-care/1025582001/.
211 Id.
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purely domestic law enforcement.212 Similar problems arise with data
collected by private parties and then purchased or obtained by the
government for more invasive or de-anonymized uses.213
Although secondary uses of information are difficult to regulate
under any standard, the normative test is more compatible with judicial
scrutiny of, for instance, transfers of data between government agencies
or between private data brokers and government officials.214 While Katz’s
expectations-of-privacy analysis is largely incompatible with the concept
of regulating law enforcement collection of already-gathered
information,215 the normative approach could allow courts to determine
that a transfer of information to law enforcement entities is regulated by
the Fourth Amendment based on its substantial potential for additional
surveillance harms.216

IV. OBJECTIONS AND ALTERNATIVES
Any test for the Fourth Amendment’s scope will have drawbacks as
well as advantages. Normative balancing’s advantages are arguably
essential to an effective Fourth Amendment test. Yet objections might be
raised that counsel against adopting normative balancing nonetheless.
This Part responds to some potential objections to a Fourth Amendment
balancing test. In the course of doing so, it touches on the deficiencies of
the current test, which carries many of the same drawbacks as the
normative test with virtually none of the benefits. This Part also discusses
the leading potential alternative to the Katz test: the positive law
approach. In doing so, it develops another argument for the normative
test—even accounting for its disadvantages, it is superior to the
alternatives.

PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT ON THE SURVEILLANCE
PROGRAM OPERATED PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
SURVEILLANCE ACT 59 (2014), https://www.pclob.gov/library/702-Report.pdf.
213 See, e.g., Renan, supra note 65, at 1062−63.
214 See generally Ric Simmons, The Mirage of Use Restrictions, 96 N.C. L. REV. 133
(2017) (discussing the difficulty of creating effective use restrictions on
government agencies).
215 See, e.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 117–18 (1984).
216 See generally supra Part I.C.2.
212
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A. Administrability and Institutional Capacity
One potential objection to the normative balancing test concerns its
administrability. Multifactor balancing standards tend to be more
complex and to have higher decision costs than other potential tests.217
Relatedly, courts may lack the institutional capacity to effectively apply
a balancing test. The normative approach asks judges to consider the
likely effects of legal regulation on police and citizen behavior, a policy
inquiry that may be better suited to a legislature.218 Although balancing
is a fundamental practice of courts (and the central metaphor of judging
involves balance scales), judges may be more effective applying narrower
standards or bright-line rules.219
The normative test is designed to mitigate some of the
administrability issues and decision costs inherent in balancing tests. It
focuses on actual practices and communications as well as measurable
internal harms rather than abstract concepts of privacy or security. It is
also designed to allow judges to consult intuitions about the potential
effects of surveillance on their own behaviors.220 Thus it is likely to be
more administrable than many balancing tests commonly used in other
areas of law.221 Further, balancing tests in general are well suited to
rulification, and the development of sub-rules to govern particular
situations is likely to reduce decision costs and increase administrability
over time.222
See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J.
557, 572–86 (1992). Concerns about decision costs may be mitigated somewhat
by the fact that stare decisis will resolve the vast majority of Fourth
Amendment decisions under any standard. See Ronald J. Allen & Ross M.
Rosenberg, The Fourth Amendment and the Limits of Theory: Local Versus General
Theoretical Knowledge, 72 ST. JOHNS L. REV. 1149, 1153−58 (1998).
218 See, e.g., Orin Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional
Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 811 (2004).
219 See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96
YALE L.J. 943, 944 (1987).
220 See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 82.
221 See, e.g., Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (weighing the
interests of states against the burdens placed on interstate commerce);
Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (weighing a government
employees’ interest in free speech against the interests of the government in
efficiently providing public services).
222 See Tokson, supra note 144, at 652.
217

45

DRAFT - Forthcoming, 104 Minnesota L. Rev. (2019)

More broadly, courts appear able to effectively apply balancing tests
that consider the effects of legal regulation in a wide variety of contexts.
First Amendment law is famously a domain of balancing tests, which
allow courts to robustly protect free speech without unduly hampering
legitimate government activities.223 Similar balancing tests are also
employed in the law of equal protection,224 procedural due process,225 the
Fifth Amendment,226 the dormant Commerce Clause,227 torts,228 and
confidentiality.229 Although a definitive analysis of balancing in these
areas would require thousands of pages, the ubiquity of balancing tests
suggests that courts are hardly incapable of applying them.
Finally, although administrability is a concern with any balancing
test, such a test could hardly be less administrable than Katz.230 Although
Katz’s reasonable expectation of privacy test is confusing enough on its
face, the test in practice is even more complex and puzzling. Frustrated
by the failures of the Katz test to embody important Fourth Amendment
principles, courts have expanded and modified the test haphazardly.231
As Orin Kerr famously described, courts have created multiple,
conflicting versions of the test, sometimes applying it literally, sometimes
looking to positive law for guidance, sometimes emphasizing the thing
being investigated, and sometimes focusing mostly on policy
considerations.232 Lower courts applying Katz in cases of first impression
must choose between these various conflicting models, yet there is no law
or norm that tells them how to make this crucial decision.233
See Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in First and Second
Amendment Analysis, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375, 386 (2009).
224 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
225 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 326 (1976).
226 New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 656−57 (1984).
227 Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
228 United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
229 See Predictable Mediation Confidentiality in the U.S. Federal System, Ellen E.
Deason, 17 OHIO ST. J. DISPUTE RESOLUTION 239 (2002).
230 See, e.g., Baude & Stern, supra note 4, at 1825, 1860 (noting Katz’s notorious
lack of administrability); see also Solove, supra note 5, at 1511; Etzioni, supra note
204, at 420–21; Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring).
231 See Tokson, supra note 144, at 647−48.
232 Kerr, supra note 193, at 507–08.
233 Although Orin Kerr has argued that certain patterns might help guide lower
court behavior, courts appear unaware of these patterns and any such
guidelines as to model selection appear to be faint and inconsistent. See Lior
223
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Unsurprisingly, in novel cases, Fourth Amendment law under the Katz
test is unpredictable and chaotic.234 By contrast, the normative test directs
a court to overtly weigh the normative considerations at issue and to
explain its actual reasons for reaching its conclusions. Not only is this a
more rigorous approach, it is a more honest one, and it can help facilitate
the development of efficient sub-rules over time.235

B. Unpredictability
A potential objection to normative approaches in general is that they
may be unpredictable and inconsistent across cases. Different judges
may reach conflicting normative conclusions or may frame policy
questions differently, leading to splits among lower courts.236 Police
officers using new surveillance techniques or facing novel situations may
have difficulty determining whether they can lawfully surveil without a
warrant.237 Ideally, a Fourth Amendment test would be predictable and
simple enough for courts and police officers alike.238
There are several reasons to think that unpredictability is not as
significant a problem as it may seem, however. First, while police officers
can simply follow established law in most cases, they are unlikely to be
able to resolve difficult Fourth Amendment questions of first impression
under any viable test, normative or otherwise. The Fourth Amendment’s
remedial doctrines already take ample consideration of this difficulty.
Qualified immunity limits officers’ liability to those cases where officers
violate clearly established law,239 and the good faith doctrine prevents the

Strahilevitz & Matthew Tokson, Should Fourth Amendment Law Pay Attention to
What People Expect? If So, How?, CONCURRING OPINIONS (Nov. 27, 2017),
https://concurringopinions.com/archives/2017/11/should-fourthamendment-pay-attention-to-what-people-expect-if-so-how.html.
234 See id.; Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring);
Solove, supra note 5, at 1519–20.
235 Tokson, supra note 144, at 619.
236 Orin Kerr, supra note 193, at 536−37.
237 Paul Ohm, The Fourth Amendment in A World Without Privacy, 81 MISS. L.J.
1309, 1333–34 (2012); Amsterdam, supra note 3, at 403–04.
238 Wayne R. LaFave, ‘Case-by-Case Adjudication’ Versus ‘Standardized Procedures':
The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 127, 141–42 (1974).
239 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
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exclusion of evidence where officers rely on law that is later
overturned.240
Even if these doctrines were to disappear, the
indemnification of police officers would prevent officers from facing
personal consequences for non-egregious legal violations.241 Moreover,
tests that are simple enough to permit police officers to reliably answer
novel Fourth Amendment questions may be profoundly deficient in other
respects, such as drastically underprotecting privacy or protecting it in
an extremely arbitrary manner.242
Second, under any Fourth Amendment test, a large majority of cases
will be governed by precedent and stare decisis. The Supreme Court has
already resolved how the Fourth Amendment applies in a wide variety
of familiar surveillance contexts, including houses, cars, investigatory
stops, inventory searches, searches incident to arrest, border stops, and
many forms of electronic surveillance.243 These precedents should
continue to guide courts and police officers under a normative test, even
as courts discard the Katz test which provided the nominal basis for many
of their outcomes. The values of stare decisis counsel preserving the
results of these cases, upon which law enforcement officials have long
relied.244 In addition, normative considerations often drove the results of
these cases far more than Katz’s ambiguous “expectations of privacy”
inquiry.245 A few existing cases should be overturned under the new test,
but stare decisis suggests overturning only cases that are especially
flawed.246
Finally, the normative test would perform no worse than the current
test in terms of predictability and consistency. For the reasons discussed
above,247 it is very difficult to predict how any case of first impression will

Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 353–54 (1987).
Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 936 (2014).
242 See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928) (holding that the
Fourth Amendment is limited to physical trespasses against tangible things).
243 See Ronald J. Allen & Ross M. Rosenberg, The Fourth Amendment and the
Limits of Theory: Local Versus General Theoretical Knowledge, 72 ST. JOHNS L. REV.
1149, 1153−58 (1998).
244 See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000).
245 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34, 40 (2001); Delaware v. Prouse, 440
U.S. 648, 662−63 (1979).
246 See infra Part V.C; Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984).
247 See supra notes 232−234 and accompanying text.
240
241
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be resolved under Katz.248 Lower courts facing novel Fourth Amendment
questions frequently produce splits249 or rule unanimously only to see
their rulings rejected by the Supreme Court.250 A normative test
grounded in the analysis of actual surveillance harm and law
enforcement benefit, aided by studies of the measurable effects of
surveillance, would if anything be more consistent than the multi-model
Katz regime.

C. Redundancy
Another potential argument against a balancing test for the Fourth
Amendment’s scope is that it would be redundant in some cases, because
the Court sometimes uses a balancing approach in determining whether
a Fourth Amendment search or seizure is “reasonable.”251 A test that
balances to determine whether something is a Fourth Amendment search
and then sometimes balances to determine whether that search is
reasonable would be partially redundant and could impose high decision
costs on courts.
Yet courts applying a balancing test for the Fourth Amendment’s
scope would not have to balance again at the reasonableness stage, even
in the subset of cases that use a reasonableness balancing test. First,
although courts in Fourth Amendment cases often weigh the policy
implications of their rulings, overt balancing tests are relatively rare in
Fourth Amendment law, especially in cases regulating law
enforcement.252 Courts tend to balance in “special needs” cases that are
Id.
Wayne A. Logan, Constitutional Cacophony: Federal Circuit Splits and the Fourth
Amendment, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1137, 1195 (2012) (listing nearly forty unresolved
circuit splits on Fourth Amendment issues).
250 See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018) (rejecting the
unanimous holding of several federal courts of appeal that cell phone location
information is not protected by the Fourth Amendment).
251 Matthew B. Kugler & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Actual Expectations of Privacy,
Fourth Amendment Doctrine, and the Mosaic Theory, 2015 SUP. CT. REV. 205, 237
(2015).
252 See, e.g., City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000) (noting that
“search or seizure is ordinarily unreasonable in the absence of individualized
suspicion of wrongdoing” and the Court has “recognized only limited
circumstances in which the usual rule does not apply.”); Chandler v. Miller, 520
248
249
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likely to involve “minimal” privacy interests and government interests
other than the traditional investigation of crime.253 To date, special needs
cases virtually always involve seizures or very clear searches such as
building inspections.254 The only issue is their reasonableness; the Fourth
Amendment’s application to the situation is obvious.
It might be objected that reasonableness balancing is not limited to
special needs cases, even if those cases are the only ones that regularly
employ balancing tests.255
Courts occasionally weigh competing
considerations when addressing novel questions of reasonableness.256
But such cases almost always involve obvious seizures (such as car stops
and Terry stops) and thus do not address the test for Fourth Amendment
searches in any event.257 In addition, these cases are rare—the default
rule for searches still requires a valid warrant,258 and the vast majority of

U.S. 305, 308 (1997) (“To be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, a search
ordinarily must be based on individualized suspicion of wrongdoing.”); see
generally Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482 (2014) (holding that a police
search of the contents of a cell phone incident to arrest was unreasonable under
the Fourth Amendment and therefore required a warrant); California v.
Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 574 (1991) (holding that the police can search a container
in an automobile without a warrant only if they have probable cause).
253 Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 624 (1989) (“In limited
circumstances, where the privacy interests implicated by the search are
minimal, and where an important governmental interest furthered by the
intrusion would be placed in jeopardy by a requirement of individualized
suspicion, a search may be reasonable despite the absence of such suspicion.”);
see also, e.g., Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665
(1989) (stating that balancing is appropriate “where a Fourth Amendment
intrusion serves special governmental needs, beyond the normal need for law
enforcement”).
254 See, e.g., Michigan Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990);
Camara v. Mun. Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 530−31 (1967).
255 Excessive force claims are generally evaluated under a totality of the
circumstances test that may incorporate balancing. See Graham v. Connor, 490
U.S. 386, 396 (1989). These cases inherently involve seizures, thus a normative
balancing test for searches is unnecessary.
256 See Sam Kamin & Justin Marceau, Double Reasonableness and the Fourth
Amendment, 68 U. MIAMI L. REV. 589, 602–03 (2014) (discussing this process in
the context of investigative stops); Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment's
Concept of Reasonableness, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 977, 1012 (collecting cases).
257 For additional examples, see Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 704–05
(1981).
258 See, e.g., Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482 (2014).
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cases that depart from that rule simply apply a suspicion-based standard
such as probable cause or reasonable suspicion.259
What if a case were to someday arise that presented both a difficult
“search” question and a special needs issue or a novel reasonableness
question that might require the court to weigh policy interests in the
course of fashioning a new rule? Even then, the normative balancing
test proposed above would displace or at least strongly inform any
balancing performed at the reasonableness stage. If a surveillance
technique caused concrete harms that outweighed its law enforcement
benefits such that it required Fourth Amendment regulation, then both
that fact and the extent of the harms and benefits would inform the
Court’s reasonableness inquiry. Most likely, no additional balancing
would be required. Even in the rarest hypothetical case, it is unlikely
that redundant balancing would be an issue.

D. Balancing and Bias
Finally, a potential objection to a balancing test for the Fourth
Amendment’s scope is that such a test will be biased in favor of the
government. Several scholars have noted that courts applying overt
balancing tests to determine the reasonableness of a seizure or search
often favor the government.260 One might extrapolate from this that
balancing inherently favors the government in the Fourth Amendment
context.261
Although the government often prevails in cases where the court
departs from the default warrant requirement and engages in balancing,
it is unlikely that the balancing is to blame. Courts typically engage in
reasonableness balancing after identifying a case as unique—as a “special

See, e.g., City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000) (noting that
“search or seizure is ordinarily unreasonable in the absence of individualized
suspicion of wrongdoing” and the Court has “recognized only limited
circumstances in which the usual rule does not apply.”).
260 Shima Baradaran, Rebalancing the Fourth Amendment, 102 GEO. L.J. 1, 1 (2013);
Eve Brensike Primus, Disentangling Administrative Searches, 111 COLUM. L. REV.
254, 296–97 (2011).
261 Richard Re, Fourth Amendment Fairness, 116 Mich. L. Rev. 1409, 1419 (2018);
Sundby, supra note 3, at 1765.
259
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needs” case rather than a normal one.262 Special needs cases are generally
outside the realm of traditional law enforcement, involving non-criminal
administrative enforcement,263 children in school,264 non-criminal drug
testing,265 and similar scenarios.266 The paradigm special needs case
involves “privacy interests [that] are minimal” and “important
governmental interest[s].”267 By classifying a case as special needs, the
court has largely already determined that its intrusions are minimal and
the government’s needs unique, even before reasonableness is assessed.
It is little wonder that the balancing in such cases is usually resolved in
the government’s favor.
There is, in other words, a strong selection effect at work here.
Courts overtly balance only in those cases where they feel that a default
warrant requirement is inappropriate.268 And yet, even in this unique
subset of cases, courts do not universally favor the government. For
instance, the Supreme Court has ruled against the government in cases
where the justifications for a drug testing program failed to outweigh its
privacy intrusions,269 where a blood test incident to arrest was too
invasive,270 and where the sanctity of the home outweighed the
government’s interest in drunk driving enforcement.271
In addition, overt balancing at the reasonableness stage may favor
the government in some cases because of flaws in the Court’s
reasonableness balancing approach, which is unrigorous and poorly
defined. It sometimes focuses on government interests writ large and
compares them to the one-off harms imposed on the single defendant

Fabio Arcila Jr., Special Needs and Special Deference: Suspicionless Searches in the
Modern Regulatory State, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1223, 1227–31 (2004).
263 Camara v. Mun. Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 530−31 (1967).
264 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 338−39 (1985).
265 Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665−66 (1989).
266 See, e.g., Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 656−57 (1995).
267 Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 624 (1989).
268 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968).
269 Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 318 (1997) (striking down a statute
mandating drug testing of candidates for certain state officers);
270 Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2184–85 (2016). See Winston v.
Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 766 (1985) (ruling in favor of the defendant in a
reasonableness balancing case despite the presence of a warrant).
271 Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 750–53 (1984).
262
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challenging the seizure or search.272 This can create a sort of imbalancing
test that favors the government by aggregating government interests
while failing to do the same for citizens.273 But the far more concrete test
developed above specifically directs courts to assess harms to citizens in
the aggregate.274 The surveillance technique at issue is hypothesized to
be widespread and its targets numerous, as frequently happens when
surveillance goes unregulated by the Fourth Amendment.275 A more
symmetrical balance should produce more symmetrical results.

E.

Positive Law Alternatives

One model that courts have used when applying Katz looks to
positive law to determine when people have a reasonable expectation of
privacy. In recent years, some scholars have suggested that courts should
apply this model exclusively, basing the scope of the Fourth Amendment
on what other sources of law permit or prohibit.276 The leading positive
law proposal envisions a test in which the Fourth Amendment applies
whenever a government officer’s investigative action would be a
violation of law, a tort, or a use of the government’s unique legal
authority.277 Although the positive law test offers some advantages, it has
several flaws that render it undesirable as a determinant of the Fourth
Amendment’s scope.
A positive law approach would be more predictable than most other
approaches, at least in the subset of cases where positive law is clear. For
instance, if a town had an ordinance prohibiting anyone but the licensed
trash collecting company from collecting people’s trash, then the police
would not be able to examine trash in that town without a warrant.278
There will be numerous other cases, however, when government
surveillance presents an issue that is unresolved in existing statutes or
Baradaran, supra note 260, at 15−21.
Id.
274 See supra text accompanying notes 75−76.
275 See supra text accompanying notes 205−206.
276 Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, Decentralizing Fourth Amendment Search
Doctrine, 107 Ky. L.J. __ (forthcoming 2019); Baude & Stern, supra note 4, at
1831−32.
277 Baude & Stern, supra note 4, at 1831−32.
278 Id. at 1882.
272
273
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precedents. Many government surveillance practices, like the use of
drug-sniffing dogs, arise rarely, if ever, in litigation between private
parties.279 Even those that do arise in litigation commonly rest on openended standards like “reasonableness,” which are often less developed in
the context of privacy torts than they are in Fourth Amendment law.280
In a variety of cases, a positive law test may simply move from a hard
Fourth Amendment question to an even harder tort question.281
Perhaps the most serious flaw in the positive law approach is the
arbitrariness of its protections. The Fourth Amendment would often rest
on considerations that have nothing to do with citizens’ privacy, security,
or freedom from government intrusion.282 Consider the trash collection
example. A person’s trash, which can reveal intimate details about
activities inside their home, would be protected in a town where laws
establish a local trash-collection monopoly, and entirely unprotected in a
town without a monopoly.283 The protection of citizens’ privacy at home
should not turn on such irrelevant details. Likewise, it makes little
difference whether the government monitors a citizen by attaching a GPS
device to her car or by tracking the car with a lawfully operated drone.
Yet the former would presumptively require a warrant, while the latter
would be wholly unregulated by the Fourth Amendment.284 It is the
Richard M. Re, The Positive Law Floor, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 313, 320 (2016).
See id.
281 Id.
282 Protecting citizens’ privacy against arbitrary government intrusion is a
fundamental purpose of the Fourth Amendment. Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616, 630 (1886) (“It is not the breaking of [a man’s] doors, and the
rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offense; but it is
the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty, and
private property . . . .”); CUDDIHY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ORIGINS
AND ORIGINAL MEANING 602–1791, at 766 (“Privacy was the bedrock
concern of the amendment, not general warrants.”); Morgan Cloud, Searching
Through History; Searching for History, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1707, 1726 (1996)
(noting that “the historical record suggests that objections to general warrants
and general searches alike rested upon broad concerns about protecting
privacy, property, and liberty from unwarranted and unlimited intrusions”);
Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L.
REV. 547, 744–45 (1999) (arguing that “it is certainly the case that the Framers
intended to preserve a personal and domestic sphere that would be
meaningfully protected against undue intrusions by government officers”).
283 Baude & Stern, supra note 4, at 1882.
284 State laws may vary, but the Restatement Second of Torts § 217 suggests that
279
280
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constant monitoring of individuals, not the de minimis touching of a car,
that invades people’s privacy and raises concerns about government
oppression. But under a positive law test, only the touching matters.
A positive law regime would have the benefits of increased
legislative control over criminal procedure, such as institutional
competence and comprehensiveness.285 But an enhanced legislative role
would also have significant drawbacks in the Fourth Amendment
context. A regime that significantly relies on legislative action to address
new surveillance questions would likely be systematically
underprotective of privacy.286 The high and growing enactment costs of
legislation and the preferences of entrenched interest groups result in a
powerful bias in favor of legislative inaction.287 Law enforcement
agencies are likely to use invasive surveillance technologies long before
legislatures regulate them via statute.288
A core function of the Fourth Amendment is to limit the ability of the
political branches of government to compromise citizens’ privacy.289 The
positive law approach would eliminate such limits so long as legislatures
allow private parties as well as officials to engage in surveillance.290
Under the positive law model, a determined government could permit its

touching a chattel without permission would be unlawful, even if the owner
could not maintain an action for damages. Laurent Sacharoff, Constitutional
Trespass, 81 TENN. L. REV. 877, 906−07 (2014).
285 John Rappaport, Second-Order Regulation of Law Enforcement, 103 CALIF. L.
REV. 205, 232−34 (2015); Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New
Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801,
870, 875 (2004).
286 This is especially the case for surveillance techniques that do not fit neatly
into existing privacy tort categories, such as location tracking or the collection
of communications metadata.
287 FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER, ET AL., LOBBYING AND POLICY CHANGE: WHO WINS,
WHO LOSES, AND WHY 24–26, 45 (2009); Tokson, supra note 10, at 193.
288 See Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Codification and Professor Kerr’s
Misguided Call for Judicial Deference, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 747, 768–71 (2005).
Likewise, statutes regulating evolving technologies tend to become obsolete
quickly, and Congress has historically failed to amend such laws to
accommodate technological change. See id.
289 See supra note 135.
290 Re, supra note 279, at 330−31. Re notes that citizens will often be unable or
unwilling to engage in such surveillance, and thus often do not present a
substantial barrier to privacy-eliminating laws. Id.
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officials to engage in any type of surveillance without judicial check.
Relatedly, a positive law approach could result in law enforcement and
national security interest groups lobbying for diminished protections
against private surveillance.291 This would both increase the scope of
permissible government monitoring and reduce existing protections
against intrusions by private parties.
Several other substantial objections to the positive law test have been
raised. Private intrusions and government investigations are very
different, and the law has regulated them differently.292 Treating them as
the same threatens to ignore the greater harms of government
investigation in many cases and the greater justifications for government
investigation in others.293 Depending on how it is applied, the positive
law test might also produce absurd results, for instance finding a Fourth
Amendment violation when a CDC researcher violates an FDA safety
regulation while conducting a blood test.294 Significant problems also
arise in cases involving data held by third parties.295 Ultimately, the
fundamental arbitrariness and underprotectiveness of the positive law
approach make it an unappealing alternative to the normative model.

V. APPLYING THE NEW MODEL
The normative approach requires courts to overtly examine the
concrete benefits and harms of government surveillance. This direct
analysis will often clarify what the “reasonable expectation of privacy”
test obscures. The normative approach can resolve novel cases more
Id. at 329.
See id. at 321−24.
293 See id.
294 See Re, supra note 279, at 318.
295 Under the leading positive law approach, for example, it is difficult to
separate out uses of the government’s unique authority (which are searches)
from informal government coercion (which is not). See Re, supra note 279, at
323. The government’s ability to obtain information held by third parties,
perhaps the central issue of modern Fourth Amendment law, would be largely
determined by the efficacy of informal pressure to persuade
telecommunications service providers to share data. Tokson, supra note 10, at
191 n. 307.
291
292
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effectively and clearly than the Katz test, which struggles with new
technologies and social practices. It can also provide a better foundation
for cases with sound outcomes but dubious rationales. Finally, the
normative model can reveal existing cases that are seriously flawed and
ripe for reversal.

A. Deciding Frontier Cases
A primary virtue of the normative test is that it can resolve with
relative ease many cases that are difficult to assess under the Katz regime.
It decides cases involving new forms of surveillance effectively, without
bogging down in a futile inquiry about societal expectations towards
novel technologies. Indeed, the Katz approach can leave Fourth
Amendment protection for a new technology unresolved long after its
adoption by the general public.
Several decades after the popularization of email, the Supreme Court
has yet to determine whether the contents of emails (or other text-based
electronic communications) are protected by the Fourth Amendment.296
Further, the leading appeals court case on emails declined to reach a
definitive ruling, instead holding that protection for emails is dependent
on the specifics of email service privacy policies and user agreements.297
The Fourth Amendment would not apply, for example, to emails
governed by a privacy policy that allows a service provider to inspect or
monitor a user’s emails.298 This echoed a previous en banc decision,
which stated that “the expectation[] of privacy that computer users have
in their emails…assuredly shifts from internet-service agreement to
internet-service agreement,” depending on the specific terms of each
agreement.299
Whether emails are protected under the Fourth Amendment remains
To be sure, dicta in Carpenter suggests that the Justices intuitively favor
extending Fourth Amendment protection to emails. But the Justices have not
assessed email collection in any depth nor addressed the user agreements and
electronic inspection issues that threaten to undermine Fourth Amendment
protection for emails.
297 United States v. Warshak (Warshak III), 631 F.3d 266, 287 (6th Cir. 2010).
298 Id. at 287.
299 Warshak v. United States (Warshak II), 532 F.3d 521, 526–27 (6th Cir. 2008)
(en banc).
296
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unresolved outside of the Sixth Circuit, and even in that circuit, it is
unknown whether third-party email services that electronically inspect
user emails strip those emails of Fourth Amendment protection.300 The
normative test would resolve these open issues definitively. The harms
to individuals of widespread government inspection of the contents of
emails are potentially enormous. There would be a profound chilling
effect on both the volume and the content of personal communications,
especially intimate or controversial communications. The scope and
vigor of the ideas conveyed via email would decrease, political activism
would be hampered, and personal relationships would be harmed and in
some cases substantially diminished.
At first glance, the law enforcement benefits of allowing the
government to read every citizen’s emails might also seem substantial,
albeit not great enough to outweigh the enormous costs. But the benefits
to law enforcement may be far less extensive than they initially appear.
The vast majority of crimes—robberies, car thefts, drug crimes, murders,
assaults, etc.—are unlikely to be discussed via email either before or after
the crime. The volume of intimate communications captured or chilled
by government observations would be exponentially higher than the
volume of emails remotely relevant to legitimate law enforcement.
Moreover, there is an ironic benefit to law enforcement in confining email
observation to those cases where the police have probable cause. In a
world where the police review virtually everyone’s emails, even
unsophisticated criminals will avoid discussing their crimes via email or
take care to securely encrypt their emails. By contrast, the currently low
probability that any given email will be read encourages criminals to
occasionally use email in the course of their crimes. The very difficulty
of generating probable cause helps ensure that, when the police do have
probable cause, they often find evidence.301 For all of these reasons, the
normative test would universally protect citizens from the routine
government inspection of personal communications, rather than leaving
them unprotected or basing protection on the unread fine print of their
software user agreements.
Dana T. Benedetti, How Far Can the Government’s Hand Reach Inside Your
Personal Inbox?: Problems with the SCA, 30 J. MARSHALL J. INFO. TECH. & PRIVACY
L. 75, 91 (2013).
301 See Minzner, supra note 157, at 923−25.
300
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A similar analysis could be performed for newer technologies such
as smart homes and voice-controlled home speakers like the Amazon
Alexa. The chilling effects and psychological harms inflicted by
government monitoring of in-home cameras and microphones would be
massive. The benefits to law enforcement would be dwarfed by such
harms, and a substantial amount of criminal activity would simply be
relocated to the basement or the back yard.

B. Fixing Cases with Unsound Rationales
Many cases decided under the Katz test are poorly reasoned, full of
incoherent statements about societal expectations or unworkable
standards that make a muddle of future cases. Yet many of the same
cases reach sound or at least defensible outcomes. The normative test can
provide a more coherent justification of these outcomes and avoid the
perils of expectation-based rationales.
For example, the Court in United States v. Miller held that the Fourth
Amendment did not apply to bank records such as checks and deposit
slips relating to an individual’s bank account.302 The Court dubiously
asserted that customers lose any expectation of privacy in their bank
records because the records are voluntarily conveyed to the banks and
are “exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of business.”303
This reasoning has been criticized extensively.304 But the outcome of
Miller, as applied to account balances, checks, and deposit slips (and not
to more revealing data like credit card purchase information) is
defensible under the normative test, and is likely undeserving of reversal.
To summarize, allowing the government to access bank records is
unlikely to harm interpersonal relationships or intimate communications.
There appears to be little in the psychological literature on harmful effects

United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440 (1976).
Id. at 442.
304 E.g., Katherine J. Strandburg, Home, Home on the Web and Other Fourth
Amendment Implications of Technosocial Change, 70 MD. L. REV. 614, 675 n. 247
(2011) (noting that the Miller court might have been wrong in analyzing bank
records as business records of the banks); Gerald G. Ashdown, The Fourth
Amendment and the “Legitimate Expectation of Privacy”, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1289,
1313−14 (1981).
302
303
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of government scrutiny of one’s finances, although surveys indicate that
people find it fairly invasive.305 The potential for substantial harm may
be limited, however, as the information disclosed in one’s deposit slips,
negotiable instruments, and account balances is unlikely to reveal
drastically more than citizens already reveal to the government in the
course of paying their taxes. Government scrutiny of bank records may
also chill certain legitimate activities in rare cases. These might include
the transfer of money to activist groups, foreign entities, or other lawful
groups disfavored by the state. These harms are non-trivial, albeit less
profound than those at issue in cases involving email searches or searches
of the home. Yet the criminal enforcement benefits of obtaining bank
records are substantial and unique. As the Court briefly noted in Miller,
bank records have a “high degree of usefulness in criminal tax, and
regulatory investigations and proceedings.”306
White collar
investigations are unique in that they typically lack physical evidence or
neutral witnesses.307 A rule that law enforcement must have probable
cause before accessing financial records “would end many white-collar
criminal investigations before they had begun.”308 Thus a court could
hold that subpoenaing bank records other than detailed credit card
records is not a Fourth Amendment search, reasoning that such records
are not especially sensitive and their benefits to law enforcement are
extensive. The normative test provides a basis for the holding of Miller
that avoids the Court’s implausible claims about assumption of risk and
its privacy-eroding conclusion that any sharing of information with a
third party eliminates Fourth Amendment protection.309
A similar rethinking could benefit cases like Kyllo v. United States,
which held that the infrared scanning of a house was a Fourth
Amendment search.310
Kyllo limited its holding to surveillance

Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 118, 737−38, tbl. 1. It was rated as more
invasive than questioning someone on the sidewalk for ten minutes, but less
invasive than searching a corporation’s computer. Id. The study did not
examine the harms of such surveillance, if any.
306 Miller, 425 U.S. at 443 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 1829b(a)(1)).
307 William J. Stuntz, O.J. Simpson, Bill Clinton, and the Transsubstantive Fourth
Amendment, 114 HARV. L. REV. 842, 859–60 (2001).
308 Id.; see also Kerr, supra note 62, at 509.
309 See Miller, 425 U.S. at 442−43.
310 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).
305
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technologies that were not in “general public use,” as people would
presumably have no expectation of privacy against a technology that was
widely used to observe or record their activities.311 The normative test
could resolve the issue without the ambiguous “general public use”
limitation, on the basis that infrared scanning to detect activities
occurring inside private homes could cause serious harms and chilling
effects on a variety of private activities within the home, and the benefits
of detecting mostly low-level drug crimes do not come close to justifying
such an intrusion.312

C. Identifying and Reversing Flawed Cases
The normative approach can also identify existing cases that are
especially flawed and ripe for reversal. In California v. Greenwood, for
instance, the Court held that opening citizens’ trash bags left on the curb
and examining their trash is not a Fourth Amendment search.313 The
Court reasoned that the defendants had no expectation of privacy
because “it is common knowledge that plastic garbage bags left on or at
the side of a public street are readily accessible to animals, children,
scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public” and thus
“respondents exposed their garbage to the public sufficiently to defeat
their claim to Fourth Amendment protection.”314
Although unsubstantiated claims about societal knowledge might
support the Court’s holding, the normative test does not. A homeowner’s
trash is especially revealing of the activities that occur inside of a home,
likely more revealing than the infrared heat scan in Kyllo. If trash
surveillance were to become widespread, the intimate activities of the
home would be exposed to the observation and judgment of others.315
Id.
See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37 (noting that all activities occurring within the home
are intimate activities).
313 California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988).
314 Id.
315 Trash inspection has not yet become widespread, but the government could
lawfully embark on a program to inspect every citizen’s trash at any time,
without legal check. As discussed above, previously unthinkable programs of
surveillance often arise as the costs of information collection and processing
decrease. See supra note 206.
311
312
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Such observation can lead to chilling effects or to significant
psychological harm.316 Trash surveillance also threatens intimate
relationships by exposing them to invasive scrutiny. The sexual and
other intimacies of a home are revealed in its trash, and the relationships
involved may be deterred or diminished by outside observation.317
Even the considerable law enforcement benefits of examining
citizens’ trash are insufficient to justify such invasive surveillance. In a
world of pervasive trash inspection, criminals are less likely to throw
away incriminating documents or evidence—the hassle of shredding or
burning such evidence would be well worth avoiding imprisonment.318
Even setting these dynamic effects aside, trash surveillance is likely to be
most effective at detecting discarded drug paraphernalia, as in the
Greenwood case.319 Not only may there be less value in pursuing low-level
drug crimes, but police may be able to investigate more serious drugtrafficking crimes by other means. The police in Greenwood, for instance,
may have had probable cause to search Greenwood’s house even without
the trash inspection, having observed heavy vehicular traffic at night, cars
visiting the house at night for only a few minutes, and a truck that drove
from the house to a narcotics-trafficking location.320 The police might
have also generated additional proof by pulling over the visiting cars
based on reasonable suspicion of drug possession.321 In short, the
normative test counsels in favor of overturning Greenwood, an especially
egregious application of the Katz test that allows police to dig through
any person’s trash without suspicion. The normative approach would
protect the intimate details of people’s activities inside their homes from
arbitrary government scrutiny.
The normative model might also spur a rethinking of Arizona v.
Hicks, where a divided Court held that moving stereo equipment in order
to view its serial number was a Fourth Amendment search.322 It is likely
that the de minimis harm caused by such inspection is outweighed by the
See Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 118, 737−38, tbl. 1; sources cited supra
notes 79, 115.
317 See Nissenbaum, supra note 99, at 138−39; Gerstein, supra note 97, at 268–69.
318 See supra text accompanying note 301.
319 Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 38.
320 Id. at 37.
321 See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682 (1985).
322 Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987).
316
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potential benefits of deterring crime and recovering stolen property, such
that no warrant should be required.
Finally, the normative approach may counsel rejecting the emerging
appeals court consensus that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to
the Internet Protocol (IP) addresses that a user visits while surfing the
internet.323 These addresses can reveal the content or at least the subject
matter of the websites that a user visits.324 Such surveillance is likely to
deter legitimate internet communications and research, potentially
stunting intellectual development and exploration.325 Further, the
evidence generated by such monitoring is likely to be weak and
circumstantial, while evidence of internet-based crimes can likely be
generated through less invasive means.326

CONCLUSION
Fourth Amendment law has undergone several dramatic shifts over
the course of its history, as courts have struggled to preserve citizens’
privacy in the face of new surveillance practices and technologies.327 The
Katz test was a particularly important shift. It allowed courts to regulate
non-physical surveillance practices by focusing on people’s “reasonable
expectations of privacy,” rather than on property.328 But the test has been
United States v. Ulbricht, 858 F.3d 71, 97−98 (2d Cir. 2017); United States v.
Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2008). IP addresses are sequences of
numbers assigned to each computer or other Internet-enabled device that is
active on a network.
324 Matthew J. Tokson, The Content/Envelope Distinction in Internet Law, 50 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 2105, 2147−50 (2009).
325 Marthews & Tucker, supra note 77; Richards, supra note 56, at 389, 421.
326 For example, the police could obtain a warrant to capture the IP addresses
that communicate with a website trafficking in child pornography or selling
illegal goods.
327 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928) (holding that the
Fourth Amendment is limited to tangible things); Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (declaring that the Fourth Amendment’s scope is not based
on physical intrusion but is determined by expectations of privacy); United
States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (holding that the Fourth Amendment’s
scope is also determined by trespass concepts); Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct.
1409 (2013) (abandoning the trespass concept for a concept based on physical
touching and social norms).
328 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 362 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
323

63

DRAFT - Forthcoming, 104 Minnesota L. Rev. (2019)

deeply flawed from the start, rightly criticized as incoherent, tautological,
and arbitrary. Increasingly, as knowledge of threats to privacy grows and
an ever-greater proportion of our data is made accessible to third parties,
societal expectations are unable to serve as an adequate foundation for
the Fourth Amendment’s protections.
The normative test offers a better approach to determining the
Fourth Amendment’s scope. It is both more consistent with the historical
purposes of the Amendment and far more resilient to social and
technological change. Its factors capture the fundamental harms of
government surveillance and are firmly grounded in precedent and
pragmatic surveillance theory. Further, its analysis is direct and
transparent, avoiding false targets and arbitrary distinctions. It is better
able to address the widespread surveillance programs that increasingly
pose the greatest threats to citizen security. And it provides a superior
method for deciding frontier cases and resolving controversies about
existing decisions.
The Supreme Court has been slow to adopt new Fourth Amendment
paradigms in the past. It took the Court nearly forty years to overrule
Olmstead v. United States,329 which ruled that the Fourth Amendment did
not apply to microphones or wiretaps. During those decades, the
government engaged in a massive program of bugging and wiretapping
private citizens.330 It used these recordings to monitor and undermine
political groups, intimidate members of Congress, and threaten civil
rights leaders, among numerous other abuses.331 These abuses did not
come to light until long after the damage had been done.332
Fourth Amendment law is in need of another paradigm shift, one
that will enable courts to protect privacy in a world of ever-changing and
expanding surveillance technologies. If history is any guide, the time for
such a change is now. The normative test, like any legal test, has both
advantages and drawbacks. But in the world of modern surveillance, it
offers the best way forward for Fourth Amendment law.

277 U.S. 438 (1928).
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331 Id.
332 See 2 Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, 183-85, 198−201 (GPO 1976).
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